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The current issue of the journal focuses on one special topic, “Constructive 
Engagement of Analytic and Continental Approaches in Philosophy: From the 
Vantage Point of Comparative Philosophy”, and consists of three peer-reviewed 
research articles that, in my opinion, have well illustrated the philosophical point and 
significance of the topic. Let me briefly explain why the journal focuses on the topic 
and how it would contribute to the concern and emphasis of the journal.  
  Especially since the first decade of the 21th century, comparative philosophy, as 
understood and practiced in a philosophically interesting way, has undergone 
significant development in its identity, coverage and mission. Comparative 
philosophy is no longer limited exclusively to the East-West comparative dialogue; it 
is neither restricted to the cases of apparent culture/region-associated traditions nor 
stops at a mere historical description of apparent similarities and difference of views 
under examination, but penetrates deeper and wider philosophically. Comparative 
philosophy, instead of being a local subfield of philosophy, has become one exciting 
general front of philosophical exploration that is primarily concerned with how 
distinct approaches from different philosophical traditions (generally covering both 
culture/region-associated and style/orientation-associated philosophical traditions
1
) 
can learn from, and constructively engage, each other to jointly contribute to the 
contemporary development of philosophy on a series of issues or topics of 
philosophical significance, which can be jointly concerned through appropriate 
philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical vantage point.  
  It is known that contemporary philosophical studies have been divided into two 
blocs or traditions concerning methodological styles or orientations of doing 
philosophy,
2
 which are often conveniently labeled „analytic‟ and „Continental‟ 
                                                 
1
 Understanding the identity of philosophical traditions in this reflectively broader way is not a mere 
verbal difference but is in serious reflective need for the sake of sophisticated appreciation of the 
internal structure of each of the closely related multiple identities of philosophical traditions and of the 
cross-tradition character in some important and relevant dimension and layer of each of these related 
identities.  
2
 It is controversial how to define or exactly characterize the identities of the analytic and 
“Continental” approaches in philosophy, and the division is not clear cut. However, the features of the 
two generic methodological styles and orientations by virtue of which their relevant figures, works or 
basic orientations can be identified are relatively clear and unambiguous, although some of these 
characteristic features per se also deserve explanation and clarification. Roughly speaking, as far as 
methodological style and orientation (at the surface level) are concerned, the analytic approach 
emphasizes conceptual analysis, logical analysis or linguistic analysis of philosophical argumentation 
and key terms; it stresses logical argument, coherent explanation, clear and precise presentation and 
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approaches or traditions in philosophy, although both labels tend to be misleading and 
inaccurate (especially the latter label). What is the relation between the two? Could 
they learn from each other and make joint contributions to the common philosophical 
enterprise? How could we carry out critical reflection on both instead of 
indiscriminately taking each of them for granted in treating philosophical issues and 
concerns? These related questions address the central concern and objective of the 
special topic of the current issue, that is, how the constructive engagement between 
the two is possible. As the constructive-engagement goal and concern is one central 
strategy of comparative philosophy, it constitutes the vision-crux dimension of the 
vantage point of comparative philosophy. Tieszen‟s article explicitly gives a 
systematic exploration of how the interaction between the two traditions on the 
relation of natural science to philosophy can help foster further constructive 
engagement between the traditions. In contrast, O‟brien‟s and Wenning‟s articles 
implicitly address the issue of the relation between the two traditions by examining 
how some valuable resources from both traditions can jointly contribute to our 
understandings and treatments of some fundamental issues of philosophical 
significance that are jointly concerned. All three articles look at the issue from the 
constructive-engagement-vision crux of the vantage point of comparative philosophy 
in their distinct ways. 
 There is another significant feature of the vantage point of comparative 
philosophy in understanding and treating the relation between the two philosophical 
traditions. Indeed, historically speaking, the two labels have been used by many to 
refer to the two styles and orientations of doing philosophy within the Western 
philosophical tradition, especially contemporary (post-Kantian) Western philosophy, 
as suggested by the label „(European) Continent(al)‟. The exploration of the relation 
between the two is not new. Within the Western philosophical tradition (or the 
contemporary Western philosophical circle) there are conferences or workshops in 
Europe and in the US that focus on the relation between analytic philosophy and 
„Continental‟ philosophy understood as two contemporary movements of thought in 
the Western tradition. However, as the primary interest and purpose of this special 
issue of the journal on the topic does not consist in doing history but philosophical 
inquiry, and as some characteristic features of the two distinct types of 
methodological styles and orientations of doing philosophy can be traced back to 
ancient sources in the Western and other philosophical traditions and have also 
                                                                                                                                           
rigorous assessment; it tends to focus more on the stable, definite, constant, consistent or universal 
aspect/dimension of (the conceptual characterization of) an object of study instead of identifying its 
historical situation or cultural setting as a prominent focus. In contrast, „Continental‟ approaches tend 
to rely more on literary (sometimes poetic) expressions and imagination of their ideas while having 
less reliance on formal logic; they are more interested in actual political and cultural settings and 
implications of an object of study. It is noted that the division does not lie in their having totally 
different concerns or topics. Both share many jointly-concerned issues or topics. Many of their 
originally identified „unique‟ concerns turn out to be distinct aspects or layers of jointly concerned 
issues or topics under appropriate philosophical interpretation and/or from a broader philosophical 
vantage point. As a systematic explanation of the identities of the two is not the purpose here, I will not 
explore this further but give this brief note for the sake of minimal clarification and understanding.  
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manifested themselves in (some) other philosophical traditions in distinct 
philosophically-interesting ways, the current issue as a whole thus examines the issue 
of how their constructive engagement is possible in a double cross-tradition (cross-
Western-tradition as well as cross-both-target-traditions) way, as addressed by 
Tieszen‟s article and as well illustrated by Wenning‟s article, though one can still 
focus on their manifestations within the Western tradition (but retaining the vision of 
the constructive engagement of comparative philosophy), as treated in O‟brien‟s 
article.  
 The constructive-engagement goal and cross-tradition character (in the foregoing 
double sense of „cross-tradition‟) of the exploration presented in the current issue as a 
whole is thus highlighted in the sub-title of the special topic, i.e., “from the vantage 
point of comparative philosophy”.  
 
 
                                                                                                                              
Bo Mou 
July 2011 
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ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE,  
AND GLOBAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
RICHARD TIESZEN 
 
 
ABSTRACT: Although there is no consensus on what distinguishes analytic from 
Continental philosophy, I focus in this paper on one source of disagreement that seems to run 
fairly deep in dividing these traditions in recent times, namely, disagreement about the 
relation of natural science to philosophy.  I consider some of the exchanges about science 
that have taken place between analytic and Continental philosophers, especially in 
connection with the philosophy of mind.  In discussing the relation of natural science to 
philosophy I employ an analysis of the origins of natural science that has been developed by 
a number of Continental philosophers. Awareness and investigation of interactions between 
analytic and Continental philosophers on science, it is argued, might help to foster further 
constructive engagement between the traditions.  In the last section of the paper I briefly 
discuss the place of natural science in relation to global philosophy on the basis of what we 
can learn from analytic/Continental exchanges. 
 
Keywords: analytic philosophy, Continental philosophy, natural science, sciences of mind, 
global philosophy, Dao-De-Jing, Buddhism 
 
 
There are many references in the philosophical literature to the division between 
analytic and Continental philosophy but it is not easy to provide a simple formulation 
of what it is that distinguishes these approaches to or styles of philosophy. There have 
been significant subdivisions within what has been considered analytic philosophy, 
such as that between formal philosophy, ordinary language philosophy, and 
conceptual analysis, and there have of course also been many variations within the 
general grouping of Continental philosophy, extending from eidetic phenomenology, 
existential phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism and semiotics, and neo-
Freudian analysis to deconstruction. Philosophers who have written about the split 
between the analytic and Continental traditions have often focused on the work of 
particular figures who seem to embody much of what is involved in the division. In 
The Origins of Analytic Philosophy, for example, Michael Dummett looks to Frege  
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and Husserl and holds that Frege took a turn into the philosophy of language but that 
Husserl did not, thus initiating a split in modern philosophy. Michael Friedman, to 
take another example, writes a book entitled A Parting of the Ways in which he 
focuses on Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger.   
 Over the years I have heard or read a host of characterizations of the two 
traditions, such as the following: Analytic philosophy strives for clarity, exactness, 
precision and Continental philosophy does not. Continental philosophy instead tends 
toward the use of poetic or dramatic language. The methodology of analytic 
philosophy is argumentation while Continental philosophy, if it has a methodology at 
all, is concerned with description or narrative or literary quality. Analytic philosophy 
is, in many domains, reductionistic in nature and Continental philosophy is not. 
Analytic philosophy tends to be ahistorical while Continental philosophy does not. 
Analytic philosophers seek to naturalize or formalize or mathematize but Continental 
philosophers do not. Analytic philosophers have, more often than not, taken the 
'linguistic turn', while this is not true of Continental philosophers. The general idea of 
the linguistic turn is that, instead of analyzing X (e.g., Being or obligation) we are to 
analyze the language of X. I have also heard it said that analytic philosophy places a 
premium on reason but Continental philosophy does not. Continental philosophy is 
instead concerned with basic issues of human existence, such as anxiety, authenticity, 
death, boredom, identity, and so on. 
 One has to be careful about all of these characterizations. I do not think that any 
one of them, as it stands, is accurate. In this paper I want to consider what I think is 
one source of disagreement that does run fairly deep in dividing the traditions, 
especially in connection with efforts in recent times to 'naturalize' philosophy in one 
way or another. Although the contours of the issue are shaped in certain ways by the 
division between analytic and Continental philosophy, it is an issue that certainly has 
implications for the broader vision of comparative philosophy that takes in cultures 
and systems of thinking from around the world. The source of disagreement I have in 
mind concerns the relationship of science, especially natural science, to philosophy. 
The issue might be formulated in different ways: Is natural science to be a model for 
philosophy or not? Is it, in some sense, foundational, so that philosophy should be 
measured against it or, rather, is philosophy, properly conceived, a foundation for 
science? Is natural science limited and one-sided as a model for philosophy or does it 
represent just the sort of regimentation we need in philosophy? One might put it in 
this way: Is natural science a condition for the possibility of legitimate philosophy or 
is philosophy in some sense a condition for the possibility of natural science? What is 
the proper way to think about the relation of philosophy to natural science? It is these 
kinds of questions, I think, that have a direct bearing on comparative philosophy in a 
broad sense, and on the prospects for constructive engagement between widely 
varying philosophical traditions.   
  Several major Continental philosophers have thought deeply and carefully about 
natural science, while others have had little to say about it one way or the other. 
Those Continental philosophers who have presented extensive critiques of the 
sciences have typically argued that philosophy or metaphysics provides a foundation 
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in some sense for the sciences, while many (but not all) analytic philosophers are 
inclined to a kind of scientism according to which our best efforts to understand 
reality and knowledge are to be found in the natural sciences. Just think of the various 
pretensions of philosophers, they might say, that have been undermined by good solid 
scientific work. Think of the revelations that have been made possible by natural 
science that would not have been possible on the basis of philosophy alone. 
 In most of this paper I compare some ideas on the relation of natural science to 
philosophy that have emerged from the traditions of analytic and Continental 
philosophy. It will of course not be possible to do justice to the many strands of 
thinking about natural science in analytic and Continental philosophy. One could ask 
general questions, for example, about the understanding or knowledge of Being (or 
non-Being) in natural science, or one could focus on the work of particular 
philosophers in either tradition. In order to make the project somewhat more 
manageable in the space available here I will focus on the philosophy of mind in 
particular, and especially on issues about human consciousness. In the final sections 
of the paper I make some remarks on how constructive engagement between different 
philosophical traditions in the world might benefit from what has transpired in the 
analytic and Continental encounters over the relation of natural science to philosophy. 
These other traditions might of course also inform the ongoing disputes that seem to 
separate analytic from Continental philosophy. 
 
1.  ILLUSTRATIVE QUOTATIONS ON THE PLACE OF SCIENCE  
IN ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
A number of the characterizations of the difference between analytic and Continental 
philosophy that I mentioned above, especially those centering around clarity, 
precision, use of argumentation, reductionism, formalization, mathematization, and 
reason, are I think directly related to this issue of how we are to view the relation of 
philosophy to natural science. Let me provide a few illustrative quotations on both 
sides of the issue from some major figures in philosophy, starting with some early 
comments of Martin Heidegger and Rudolph Carnap that express an animosity that 
persisted for many years. Heidegger wrote extensively on science and technology, 
and many philosophers know his remark that “science does not think”. Already in 
his 1929 lecture “What Is Metaphysics?” Heidegger says that 
 
Science would like to dismiss the nothing with a lordly wave of the hand.  But in our 
inquiry concerning the nothing it has by now become manifest that scientific existence is 
possible only if in advance it holds itself out into the nothing. It understands itself for 
what it is only when it does not give up the nothing. The presumed soberness of mind and 
superiority of science become laughable when it does not take the nothing seriously.  
Only because the nothing is manifest can science make beings themselves objects of 
investigation. Only if science exists on the base of metaphysics can it advance further in 
its essential task, which is not to amass and classify bits of knowledge but to disclose in 
ever-renewed fashion the entire region of truth in nature and history. 
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Metaphysics is the basic occurrence of Dasein. It is Dasein itself. Because the truth of 
metaphysics dwells in this groundless ground it stands in closest proximity to the 
constantly lurking possibility of deepest error. For this reason no amount of scientific 
rigor attains to the seriousness of metaphysics. Philosophy can never be measured by the 
standard of the idea of science. 
 
In his infamous paper “The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of 
Language” (1932) in which he attacks the lecture of Heidegger from which I just 
quoted, alleging that it is filled with meaningless pseudo-sentences, the logical 
positivist Carnap says the following: 
 
The development of modern logic has made it possible to give a new and sharper answer 
to the question of the validity and justification of metaphysics…In the domain of 
metaphysics, including all philosophy of value and normative theory, logical analysis 
yields the negative result that the alleged statements in this domain are entirely 
meaningless. 
 
But what, then, is left over for philosophy, if all statements whatever that assert 
something are of an empirical nature and belong to factual science?  What remains in not 
statements, nor a theory, nor a system, but only a method: the method of logical analysis.  
It is the indicated task of logical analysis, inquiry into logical foundations, that is meant 
by „scientific philosophy‟ in contrast to metaphysics. 
 
In The Logical Syntax of Language (1934), Carnap goes on to claim that 
 
Philosophy is to be replaced by the logic of science – that is to say, by the logical analysis 
of the concepts and sentences of the sciences, for the logic of science is nothing other 
than the logical syntax of the language of science. 
 
The engagement between analytic and Continental philosophy that developed around 
these kinds of claims was not often not very constructive. 
 An interesting response to Carnap, in turn, can be found in the remarks of one of 
the greatest logicians of all time, Kurt Gödel. Gödel, who attended meetings of the 
Vienna Circle on a regular basis, says that 
 
Mathematical logic should be used by more nonpositivistic philosophers. The positivists 
have a tendency to represent their philosophy as a consequence of logic -- to give it 
scientific dignity.  Other philosophers think that positivism is identical with mathematical 
logic, which they consequently avoid. (Kurt Gödel, as cited by Hao Wang in Wang 1996, 
174.)   
 
It is known that Gödel began to study Husserl's work in 1959.
1
 Writing about his 
interest in Husserl in a lecture manuscript from 1961, “The Modern Development of 
the Foundations of Mathematics in the Light of Philosophy”, Gödel says     
                                                 
1
  For more on Gödel and Husserl, see Tieszen 2011. 
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... not only is there no objective reason for the rejection of [phenomenology], but on the 
contrary one can present reasons in its favor. 
 
Gödel comments on one of the central concepts in Husserlian phenomenology, the 
concept of intentionality: 
 
One fundamental discovery of introspection marks the true beginning of psychology.  
This discovery is that the basic form of consciousness distinguishes between an 
intentional object and our being pointed (directed) toward it in some way (willing, 
feeling, cognizing). There are various kinds of intentional object.  There is nothing 
analogous in physics.  This discovery marks the first division of phenomena between the 
psychological and the physical.  (Wang 1996, 169) 
 
 Finally, I note a remark by Quine (1960, § 45) about this same concept of 
intentionality: 
 
The Scholastic word „intentional‟ was revived by Brentano in connection with the verbs 
of propositional attitude and related verbs [such as] „hunt‟, „want‟, etc.  The division 
between such idioms and the normally tractable ones is notable. We saw how it divides 
referential from non-referential occurrences of terms.  Moreover it is intimately related to 
the division between behaviorism and mentalism, between efficient cause and final cause, 
and between literal theory and dramatic portrayal. 
 
One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of intentional 
idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or as showing the 
baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science of intention. My 
attitude, unlike Brentano‟s, is the second. 
 
 It would of course be possible to provide many more quotations to show that 
differences over the relationship of (natural) science to philosophy continue to divide 
analytic from Continental philosophers. It is an issue that has at times clearly 
interfered with constructive engagement between the two traditions. Skirmishes of 
this type even receive a lot of attention in the popular press on occasion, as happened 
several years ago with the so-called „Sokal hoax‟, which led to the book by Alan 
Sokal and Jean Bricmont titled Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' 
Abuse of Science and to the more recent Beyond the Hoax: Science, Philosophy and 
Culture by Sokal.  
  
2.  PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AS AN EXAMPLE 
 
The relationship of science to philosophy in analytic and Continental philosophy is a 
large issue. I would like to limit the scope of the discussion somewhat, as I indicated, 
by considering as an example the differing views in the case of the philosophy of 
mind, especially as this concerns human consciousness. The twentieth century saw a 
succession of efforts, championed by many analytic philosophers, to develop a 
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natural science of the human mind. The natural sciences involved were of different 
types but what they had in common, as I will argue in a moment, is a set of features 
that has to be in place if natural science is to exist at all. Neuroscience played the 
central role in identity theory, while behaviorists focused instead on trying to develop 
a science at the level of observable human behavior, dispositions to behave, and 
operant conditioning. Since the time that identity theory emerged there have been 
various forms of neuroscientific reductionism. From a different direction, linguistics 
was being linked by some thinkers with the effort to develop a natural science of the 
mind. Functionalism then emerged in response to problems with behaviorism and 
identity theory. Computational or Turing machine functionalism was the main 
contender. It was at this stage that computer science entered into the effort to develop 
a natural science of the mind. This approach itself splintered into 'symbolic', serial 
models of minds, parallel distributed processing (connectionist) models of minds, or 
various hybrids of such models. At an even later stage such models were criticized for 
their lack of biological realism. Evolutionary biology, it was argued, should figure 
into any science of the mind. Perhaps we are, for example, „Darwin machines‟ of 
some kind. 
 Every one of these efforts to develop a (natural) science of the mind in the 
twentieth century, however, was faced with the same problem: leaving out or failing 
to do justice to consciousness. This “problem of consciousness” has been invariant 
through all of these positions, as well as a number of other positions, and at present it 
is just as troublesome for natural science as it has ever been. From the point of view 
of a number of Continental philosophers, however, it is obvious why the problem of 
consciousness has persisted throughout all of the efforts to develop a natural science 
of the mind. I think that some of Husserl's work, in particular, makes this especially 
clear.  In order to see why the problem has persisted I will start by considering some 
of the conditions that have to be met in order for modern natural science to be 
possible. 
 
3.  THE ORIGINS OF MODERN NATURAL SCIENCE 
  
Science, as we understand it today, did not always exist. There are deep analyses of 
the origins of modern natural science, especially from the side of some Continental 
philosophers. What we need to do is to consider some of the general features involved 
in our understanding the world on the basis of the natural sciences. In speaking of 
„natural sciences‟ in this paper I have in mind primarily what have been called the 
„hard‟ sciences, such as the various areas of mathematical physics, chemistry, 
computer science, and the like. A distinction is sometimes drawn between the natural 
sciences and the human sciences. There are features of the natural sciences that are 
not always present in sciences or areas of investigation that focus on human beings 
and their activities, such as the social sciences. The following aspects of our 
experience, aspects that can overlap and condition one another, are involved in 
making the natural sciences possible:   
10 
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 (1) The central epistemic idea of empiricism or naturalism is that all knowledge is 
derived from sensory (external or outer) experience. Evidence in natural science is 
based on sensory experience. Natural sciences often seek to determine causal 
relations and proffer causal explanations in domains of inquiry that are based on 
sensory experience of objects and processes in nature, although there are some 
anomalies about this in domains such as quantum physics. Hypotheses in natural 
science need not always be causal.  They can be merely correlational.   
    (2) The distinction between quantitative and qualitative aspects of our experience 
of the world, and the use of calculational or mechanical techniques with the 
quantitative aspects.   
  (3) The distinction between formal and “material” aspects of our thinking and 
understanding (where calculation can also be used with the formal aspects) along with 
a related distinction between form and meaning.  
  (4) The role of idealization and abstraction.   
   (5) The related distinction between the universal and the particular, or between 
the general and the specific, with the idea that natural science is to seek generalities, 
uniformities, or universal laws concerning natural phenomena in different domains.   
   (6) The fact that there are prereflective and immediate forms of experience and 
also more reflective, mediate forms of experience.   
  (7) The fact that science requires „objectivity‟, so that some way of separating the 
objective from the subjective is called for by modern science. 
      I will not say much here about point (1). Hypotheses of natural science are 
sometimes correlational and not causal, and some theories of natural science are 
mostly, if not entirely, descriptive in nature. The claim that that all knowledge is 
derived from sensory (external or outer) experience, however, establishes a baseline 
for natural sciences. Sense experience is perfectly appropriate for and is required by 
empirical sciences. Concerning point (2), one of the central features involved in many 
of the natural sciences is calculative thinking. Not all types of thinking appear to be 
calculative but calculative thinking is a condition for the possibility of many of our 
sciences. One simply cannot engage in vast domains of natural science without 
calculative methods and concepts. It can of course take a great deal of training and 
specialization to master and develop these methods and concepts, and the methods 
and concepts will themselves take on more or less value as a function of how much 
work they do, the range of their application, how efficient they are, and so on. 
Calculative thinking requires that we be able to distinguish quality from quantity in 
phenomena. One must be able to quantify phenomena to make them amenable to 
calculational techniques. This emphasis on the mathematization of experience is 
clearly present at the beginning of modern natural science in the distinction between 
so-called primary and secondary qualities. Such a distinction can be found in the 
work of Galileo, Descartes, Locke, and others. It has been argued that the distinction 
is present even in ancient Greek philosophy. In Galileo's work, for example, number, 
shape, magnitude, position, and motion are taken to be primary qualities and colors, 
tastes, smells, and warmth/cold to be secondary qualities. The former properties are 
seen as objective features of experience while the latter are viewed as subjective. 
11 
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Indeed, the primary qualities are just those that are mathematizable and, in Galileo‟s 
view, are absolute and immutable, while the secondary qualities are sensory, relative, 
and fluctuating. Knowledge is concerned with primary qualities, but opinion and 
illusion are generally associated with secondary qualities. One might hold that the 
primary qualities inhere in the objects themselves while secondary qualities do not.  
The primary qualities are tightly linked with third-person, empirical observation.  
They are the “objective” features of the world of causes and effects. 
       The features of quantification and calculation are attended by the feature 
involved in scientific understanding mentioned in point (3): the shift from 
“contentual” or “material” aspects of thinking and understanding to formal aspects.  
The quantifiable aspects of our experience are represented in mathematical and 
logical formulas. Mathematics, mathematical physics, chemistry, engineering, and 
many of the other pure and applied sciences require that we discern the form or 
structure of phenomena. In attempting to determine the form or structure of a 
phenomenon a kind of formal abstraction takes place. What we abstract from, what is 
not needed, is what I have called the „content‟ or „matter‟ associated with the 
phenomenon. One of the interesting outgrowths of mathematization is that once we 
have worked out the appropriate mathematics for the scientific treatment of a 
phenomenon we can often mechanize the mathematics.   
  What we have said thus far is that with the modern understanding of the world in 
natural science there is often a focus on quantitative aspects of our experience, where 
computational techniques are used with the quantitative features abstracted. The 
understanding of the world in natural science, in a similar vein, involves a shift to 
formal or structural features of experience in which we abstract from content or 
certain aspects of meaning. These shifts, as indicated in point (4), are attended by a 
kind of idealization. Everyday experience is inexact and imprecise in a variety of 
ways. With the shift to quantification and formalization we obtain a kind of precision 
and exactness that is otherwise not available to us. This move toward the more exact 
and precise involves us in various idealizations. We leave behind some of the 
complexity and richness but also the imperfection of the plenum of everyday 
experience. The scientific understanding of the world is thus typically an 
understanding in which various idealizations of the world are at work.  
     Points (2), (3) and (4) are closely related to some issues about the language of 
science and the language of philosophy. It is not possible to quantify and calculate in 
just any language. The languages in which we quantify and calculate in many of the 
natural sciences are exact, formal languages. In the sciences one attempts to eliminate 
ambiguity and vagueness. This is a prerequisite for testing and confirming theoretical 
hypotheses, and for making predictions. If we cannot minimize the number of 
possible interpretations of the expressions of the language of a science then we cannot 
obtain definite results that can be corroborated. Scientific language is thus generally 
characterized by a kind of exactness and rigor that we do not find outside of the 
sciences. 
 According to point (5), natural science requires that we be able to distinguish 
universal from particular features in our experience. Natural science is all about 
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finding regularities, generalizations, or lawlike features of the world on the basis of 
our particular sensory experiences. Points (2), (3), and (4) are all involved in making 
this possible.    
     As I have been indicating, the understanding of the world provided by natural 
science involves various kinds of abstraction. It requires us to abstract from a larger 
whole, i.e., the whole of our experience. It is common in certain theories of wholes 
and parts to distinguish “pieces” (independent parts) from “moments” (non-
independent parts). What makes a part of a whole a piece is just that it can exist 
independently of the whole of which it is a part, while this is not possible in the case 
of moments.  Moments are abstractions that are “founded” on larger given wholes. 
Now quantification, formalization, generalization, variation and the like are moments 
of our experience. They are founded on our experience as a whole, where this 
experience also includes qualitative, contentual, non-calculational, “meaningful”, 
referential, and particular or specific aspects. The modern understanding of the world 
in natural science would therefore count as a founded understanding of the world. 
This means that there is a deeper, founding whole on which it depends and of which it 
is a part. In a book that is of some interest for comparative philosophy, The Crisis of 
the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Edmund Husserl calls 
the deeper founding stratum of everyday practices and perception the “lifeworld” 
(Lebenswelt). This notion of the lifeworld had a significant impact on subsequent 
work in the Continental tradition of philosophy. A conception such as the lifeworld 
can also be found in the work of other philosophers. Wilfrid Sellars, for example, 
distinguishes what he calls the 'manifest image' of the world from the “scientific 
image”. Sellars would probably be considered by most people, by the way, to be an 
analytic philosopher.   
  This leads us to point (6). The founded understanding of the world that is present 
in natural science and modern technology requires the various kinds of reflective 
activities we have been discussing. The modern scientific understanding of the world 
is, I would like to argue, a more reflective form of understanding that involves us in 
various abstractions and idealizations. There are, however, also prereflective and 
more immediate forms of understanding or awareness. These are forms of 
understanding or awareness that do not involve all of the abstractions and scientific 
theorizing that are in the background of the understanding of the world in natural 
science.    
  To abstract features of our experience is not itself to be engaged in experience in 
the same way that we would be were we not abstracting. Abstracting features of 
experience already requires, as we said, taking a more reflective stance on our 
experience. Indeed, we might draw a general (albeit relative) distinction between 
reflective and prereflective modes of experience. Prereflective modes of experience 
would be more immediate forms of experience. They would not involve the kind of 
mediation that attends higher levels of generalization, abstraction, imaginative 
variation, and theory construction. So the features we abstract from our experience 
are founded on some larger whole of experience. As Husserl says, there is a founding 
level of experience and then also founded forms of experience. The natural sciences 
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must count as providing us with a founded form of experience. Modern natural 
science is built up over time out of abstractions that involve more reflective, mediate 
and theoretical stances on our experience. There are, as it were, layers of thinking, 
directedness, and experience. Various Continental philosophers have pointed out that 
there can be and has been lifeworld experience without natural science.   
  What this higher-level interpretive scheme yields, however, is just the kind of 
distinction noted in point (7). Points (2)-(6), which are concerned with quantification, 
calculation, formalization, idealization, exactness, precision, and generalization, all 
involve a more reflective, mediated perspective on the world. Along with point (1), 
they are all features that allow us to separate what is objective from what is 
subjective. The scientific understanding of the world involves us in a higher degree of 
objectification of the world. It is thanks to these features that other commonly 
recognized aspects of objectivity are possible, such as intersubjective agreement on 
methods and results and repeatability of calculations, experiments, procedures, and 
the like. As mentioned earlier, it was the intention of Galileo and other founders of 
modern natural science to distinguish what was absolute and immutable from what 
was relative, fluctuating and due solely to subjective sensory experience. Knowledge 
is then supposedly concerned with the former characteristics and the rest is a matter 
of opinion and illusion. It is a corollary of our earlier analysis that this search for 
“objective” characteristics itself involves a kind of abstraction from our experience.  
The point is precisely to excise the subjective aspects of experience. What we obtain 
with natural science is a kind of objectivity that would otherwise be lacking in our 
epistemic enterprises. We can leave behind the inner sensings, feelings, thoughts, and 
subjective perspectives and focus on the outer observable phenomena that would, in 
principle, be available to all. What natural science yields is just the third-person 
stance on the world. In short, the intention behind it is precisely to abstract from 
human subjectivity, to minimize subjectivity and maximize objectivity. 
  With these seven points we can therefore specify some of the central elements of 
the scientific understanding of nature, an understanding that has set the tone for a lot 
of thinking in analytic philosophy. The features I have discussed, taken as a whole, 
give us a particular perspective on the world. They provide a way of interpreting the 
world. Science reveals the world to us in a certain way. It is by these means that we 
approximate an exactness, clarity, and distinctness in our knowledge that is not part 
of our everyday, informal understanding of the world. Indeed, an interpretive scheme 
comprised of these components has a normative character. In light of the successes of 
mathematical natural science and modern technology we might come to believe that 
we should quantify, formalize, and idealize. This kind of interpretive scheme is 
routinely applied to nature and everything in nature. We can see how it is at work in 
the various natural sciences. It conditions what is revealed to us and the revelations of 
natural science have indeed been very successful, yielding predictions, control, and 
hence a remarkable kind of power over nature in many domains. Great advances in 
science and technology have been made on many fronts.      
   Before moving on to the next section, it should be noted that I do not mean to 
deny that there are sciences that lack some of the features mentioned in the seven 
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points above. Several of the points are necessary conditions for natural science but 
some parts of natural science might be non-quantitative, might be primarily 
descriptive and not focused on providing causal explanations, or might not engage 
formalization to any significant extent. I will make some further comments about this 
below.   
 
4.  LIMITATIONS ON NATURAL SCIENCE IN PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 
 
The distinctions that lie behind the empiricist, scientific worldview and modern 
mechanism that are indicated in our seven points allow us to separate the subjective 
from the objective. They are in fact used for just this purpose. With quantification, 
calculation, formalization, idealization and exactness we obtain intersubjective 
agreement on methods and results, including repeatability of calculations, 
experiments, procedures, and predictions. We obtain a kind of objectivity, and 
objectivity is what we seek everywhere in the modern sciences.   
  Now here is the point that is made by a number of Continental philosophers: 
what happens when this kind of interpretive scheme is turned back around on human 
beings in particular? What happens is that the very methods required in order for the 
natural sciences to be possible are methods that abstract away from subjectivity, 
consciousness, intentionality, and other features of experience itself. Positions that 
have been favored by many analytic philosophers, such as behaviorism, 
computational functionalism, connectionism, and neuroscientific reductionism about 
the mind, all tend toward or even promote a kind of eliminativism about 
consciousness, intentionality, qualia, and the like. It is not surprising that what is 
“revealed” to us is that the nature of human being is quantifiable, formalizable or 
computational.   
 When we turn natural science back around on ourselves we thus find that, true to 
our intentions to eliminate human subjectivity, we have eliminated human 
subjectivity with all of its complexity and detail. Instead we have a purely objectified 
subject, merely the outer shell as it were. Consciousness, the very essence of 
subjectivity, disappears. At earlier stages in the development of the modern sciences 
the human body was interpreted as a machine, with the effect that the “lived body” 
and bodily intentionality were ignored.  The distinction between the human body as a 
purely material thing (Körper) and the lived body (Leib) as a source of intentionality 
and meaning conferral was covered over (see, e.g., Husserl 1970). The mind/body 
problem develops at the point at which the body is seen as an object of natural 
science, as purely objective, but the mind is not yet seen as an object of natural 
science. If the mind is still seen as subjective, even as a soul, then how could it 
possibly be related to the body? As the natural sciences are extended and augmented 
the human mind also comes to be seen in purely objective terms in various “sciences 
of the mind”, e.g., as a machine.   
 Thus, we develop in the sciences an interpretive scheme the goal of which is to 
absolutely minimize subjectivity and to maximize objectivity and when we apply this 
interpretive scheme to the human mind we see that we achieve just this effect. The 
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problem is that we are forgetting what this interpretive scheme abstracts from or 
leaves behind in the first place. It is not a foundation but is rather already a founded, 
reflective scheme that depends on making the abstractions we have noted (e.g., 
quantitative from qualitative features, primary from secondary qualities, form from 
content) and then forgetting about the whole from which they were abstracted. Hence, 
it can become a limited or one-sided view that conceals much that is important about 
human cognition. The key point is this: the claim that the human mind or body is the 
“object” of one of these sciences depends on the fact that human beings whose 
cognitive acts exhibit intentionality have developed a particular interpretive scheme 
in the first place, a scheme which they have then applied to themselves. We have, in 
effect, taken an important and fruitful interpretive scheme and applied it beyond its 
legitimate boundaries. In so doing, we substitute parts of what we are for the whole. 
At the founding level of all of this, however, we have human subjects with 
intentionality who build up ways of understanding the world through their manifold 
capacities for interpretation. The claim that human minds and bodies are to be 
understood only through such natural sciences rests on a development that 
presupposes the human capacity for meaning conferral, intentionality, directedness, 
acts of abstraction, and so on.  Science itself is just a kind of directedness. It is a type 
of intentionality. Our awareness of our own consciousness, however, does not depend 
on building up layers of scientific theory, abstraction, idealization, and so on. At the 
prereflective, pre-scientific level humans are already conscious interpreters of the 
world who are directed toward various goals.
 
 
 Among the features of human consciousness that should presumably be 
considered in the philosophy of mind but that tend to be concealed by the filtering 
required for natural science are the following:  more detailed structural features of the 
intentionality of consciousness, the meaning-giving character of conscious 
experience, the perspectival character of consciousness, the inner and outer horizons 
associated with acts of consciousness, the figure/ground structure of consciousness, 
qualia, the temporal structure of consciousness with its retention-protention and 
secondary memory components, the underdetermination of perceptual observation by 
sensation, and so on. 
 Focusing on this example in the philosophy of mind, let us now come back to the 
questions posed I posed earlier on the relation of science to philosophy in analytic and 
Continental philosophy. Is natural science to be a model for philosophy of mind or 
not? Is it, in some sense, foundational, so that philosophy should be measured against 
it or, rather, is philosophy, properly conceived, a foundation for science? Is natural 
science limited and one-sided as a model for philosophy of mind or does it represent 
just the sort of regimentation we need in philosophy? Is natural science a condition 
for the possibility of legitimate philosophy or is philosophy in some sense a condition 
for the possibility of natural science?
  
 
The argument is that if we are to see things whole then we must keep both 
objectivity and subjectivity in the picture. The interpretive scheme involved in natural 
science provides us with a founded understanding of the world and there is a deeper, 
founding whole on which it depends. This deeper founding stratum of everyday 
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practices and perception, as noted above, is called the “lifeworld” in Husserl's 
philosophy. There are prereflective and more immediate forms of understanding and 
knowing. These are forms of understanding and knowing that do not involve all of the 
abstractions of the interpretive scheme we have been discussing. Natural science has 
not always existed but it does not follow that human beings had no understanding or 
knowledge of anything prior to the development of natural science. On the view I am 
describing the interpretive scheme of the natural sciences is not foundational but is 
itself founded on our lifeworld experience.
2
 Natural science can make us blind to our 
own subjective experience. Thus, I am arguing against reductionism in this sense.   
 Skepticism about the claim that human consciousness is real or that human 
subjective qualitative states are real, for example, is skepticism gone too far. I think it 
is a false dilemma to claim that we must choose between pure objectivity and pure 
subjectivity. Surely there can be some objectivity about human subjectivity. We can 
presumably even arrive at objective claims about human consciousness that are not 
based on natural science. These would be claims about the structures of human 
consciousness that make natural science possible in the first place. For example, it 
seems to be invariant across different human subjects that human consciousness is 
perspectival, or that human beliefs exhibit intentionality. In the case of intentionality, 
what could it possibly mean to say that humans have beliefs but the beliefs are not 
about anything? Objective claims about human consciousness that are not based on 
natural science, such as statements about intentionality, the perspectival character of 
consciousness, the horizons of conscious acts, qualia, the temporal structure of 
consciousness, and so on, might very well involve generalization, abstraction, and 
perhaps even some idealization, but this seems to be inescapable if there is to be any 
theory or any philosophy of anything. The point is not to abandon theory or 
philosophy but to exercise a kind of skepticism about one-sided or reductionistic 
theorizing or philosophizing. We should also put a somewhat finer point on our 
remarks about science here. Some phenomenologists, for example, have followed 
Husserl in thinking that there can be an eidetic, apriori science of human 
consciousness, where the model of science does not stem from empiricism but rather 
from the tradition of rationalism. Objectivity about subjectivity on such a view would 
certainly involve abstraction, material a priori generalization from particular 
individuals, making essences salient through imaginative variation, and so on. 
Phenomenology, on this view, would not be a natural science but would be a material 
a priori science that is descriptive, primarily non-quantitative, not in search of causal 
explanation, and not engaged in formalization to any extent. It was already noted 
above how there are even parts of natural science that are descriptive, primarily non-
                                                 
2
 Thus one can also see why Continental philosophers who reflect on science often use language that 
differs from the language of science. Should we expect that which is presupposed by a science to be 
expressed in the language of that science? Generally, should we expect a statement of the conditions 
for the possibility of science to use the language of science? It is a further matter, however, just what 
kind of language is appropriate at the founding level. One sees wide ranging differences on this matter 
within Continental philosophy. My own view is that obscurantism in philosophy is not very helpful, 
but I won't go into the issues here.     
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quantitative, not in search of causal explanation, and not engaged in formalization to 
any extent. Natural science, however, cannot be construed as a material a priori or 
eidetic science.
3
 Many Continental philosophers in Husserl‟s wake, however, 
abandoned his idea of phenomenology as eidetic science. Indeed, the model of 
„scientific‟ philosophy in any form was rejected.  
   
5. CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT OF  
ANALYTIC AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY? 
  
Although I have focused on some particular issues about natural science and 
consciousness, one could consider many other kinds of examples. Suppose we ask, 
for example, whether biological evolution makes the human mind possible. 
According to our best scientific theory on the matter, the theory of evolution, the 
answer of course is „yes‟. The argument we are considering can be construed as 
agreeing with this and then adding that we should nonetheless not forget that the 
human mind makes the theory of evolution possible in the first place. Certain features 
of human cognition, as just suggested, are presupposed by the existence of any theory 
whatsoever. These features are, in this sense, a condition for the possibility of theory 
construction.  What would these prior ('a priori') conditions be? It seems to me to be 
perfectly legitimate to hold that it is the business of philosophy to explore this 
question. We can say the same thing about each of our best scientific theories.
 
 I think there can be no doubt that the engagement between analytic and 
Continental philosophy has at times been destructive. It has had its episodes of 
bitterness, exclusion, power politics, and so on. Do I think constructive engagement 
between analytic and Continental philosophy on the relation of science to philosophy 
is possible? Yes. This is possible not only in philosophy of mind but also in other 
areas in which differences have been manifest. It may not be an easy problem to 
overcome (consider again the quotations in Section 1 of this paper), but if we can see 
more clearly into our own philosophical past in the twentieth century then we can 
perhaps make more progress in fostering constructive engagement and balance 
between at least some elements of these traditions. Indeed, a number of the featured 
speakers in the Center for Comparative Philosophy Symposium for which this paper 
was written have fostered such constructive engagement over the years: Dagfinn 
Føllesdal has done this in connection with ideas of Quine and Husserl, Hubert 
Dreyfus is known for his work on the relation of Heidegger to artificial intelligence 
and cognitive science, and John Searle has worked on intentionality and philosophy 
of language. There are now many other instances of such cross-tradition engagement.  
In the past few decades there has been a significant postanalytic turn within analytic 
philosophy as well as an analytic turn in parts of Continental philosophy. This 
signifies progress, in my view. Not only is it good to try to prevent wars but the 
interactions have been fruitful in many ways. 
                                                 
3
 For more on the distinction between material a priori science and material a posteriori science see, 
e.g., Chapter 1 of  Tieszen 2005. 
18 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011)  TIESZEN 
 
6.  THE PLACE OF NATURAL SCIENCE IN GLOBAL PHILOSOPHY 
  
The split between analytic and Continental philosophy is a relatively recent 
phenomenon in the tradition of Western philosophy. What bearing, if any, does it 
have on comparative philosophy in a broad sense, and on the prospects for 
constructive engagement between widely varying philosophical traditions? What 
implications might it have for philosophy in traditions such as those associated with 
China, India, the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and so on? I think that the 
issues that have been raised about the relation of natural science to philosophy in 
analytic and Continental philosophy are certainly relevant to and important for 
comparative philosophy in a broader sense. Western philosophy has been deeply 
influenced by science and technology but there have also been reactions against this 
influence in some quarters in Western philosophy. This dynamic is still being played 
out. Philosophy in other parts of the world has arguably not yet engaged with science 
and technology to the same extent, although this is happening more and more as time 
passes. What is the appropriate relation of natural science to philosophy? Some 
interesting and important answers to this question have already been thematized and 
developed in the interactions between analytic and Continental philosophy. 
 Science and technology have affected our world profoundly and they will 
continue to do so. The investigation of relation of natural science to philosophy in a 
global context is a large topic in its own right, but let me just briefly mention two 
further examples to give an indication of what I have in mind. It would be possible to 
choose many such examples.   
  Example 1 -- Daoism Meets Natural Science. One of my favorite texts in Chinese 
philosophy is the Dao-De-Jing. Now what is the appropriate relation of natural 
science to philosophy when natural science meets a philosophical and poetic text such 
as the Dao-De-Jing? The Wing-Tsit Chan translation of Chapter 1 of the Dao-De-
Jing reads as follows
4
:  
 
The Tao that can be told of is not the eternal Tao; 
The name that can be named is not the eternal name. 
The Nameless is the origin of Heaven and Earth; 
The Named is the mother of all things. 
Therefore let there always be non-being, so we may see their subtlety, 
And let there always be being, so we may see their outcome. 
The two are the same, 
But after they are produced, they have different names. 
They both may be called deep and profound. 
Deeper and more profound, 
The door of all subtleties! 
                                                 
4
  The English translations of the Dao-De-Jing vary widely. For an interesting perspective on this, with 
an alternative translation of the first sentences of Chapter 1 of the Dao-De-Jing, see my colleague Bo 
Mou's 2003.   
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I think that many philosophers would take this passage to have more in common with 
certain types of Continental philosophy than it does with types of analytic philosophy. 
Be that as it may, what is the appropriate relation of natural science to this kind of 
philosophy? Presumably natural science should not be or is not in a position to 
dismiss such a philosophical text with a lordly wave of the hand. Perhaps we need to 
exercise some skepticism about science as “the Grand Narrative” (in Derrida's 
colorful but derisive phrase). One might be worried about what remains of the 
passage if we measure it against the standards of natural science that were spelled out 
in Section 3 above, such as empirical verification, limitation to primary qualities that 
can be quantified and formalized, preference for form over content, preference for 
exact language, and so on. As we argued in Sections 3 and 4, the conditions (1)-(7) 
provide a founded interpretation of the world that starts with sense experience and 
then abstracts, idealizes, quantifies, formalizes, and possibly mechanizes. It is an 
interpretation that provides a certain perspective on the world. It has been argued that 
such an interpretive scheme reveals many remarkable facts about the world but that 
we must also be careful about what it might conceal. The interactions that have taken 
place between analytic and Continental philosophy suggest that we need to take care 
not to forget about the whole from which the interpretation was abstracted. Are there 
important perspectives on the world that might be concealed or forgotten if we adopt 
the interpretive scheme of the natural sciences? Should we not be careful about 
slipping into an eliminative reductionism here? These are all points have been made 
and discussed in the literature on the place of science in analytic and Continental 
philosophy. Heidegger even says at one point that “...perhaps ancient traditions of 
thought will awaken in Russia or China which will help man achieve a free 
relationship to the technological world” (Heidegger 1977). It is known that Heidegger 
studied the Dao-De-Jing. 
  Example 2 – Buddhism Meets Natural Science. What happens, for example, when 
philosophical views such as logical positivism or neuroscientific reductionism meet 
Buddhist philosophy? It is not clear to me that one could expect the engagement in 
this case to be constructive. Is Buddhist philosophy to be measured by the standards 
of science? Is natural science to be dismissed in Buddhist philosophy? The point is 
that Buddhism would do well not to be subject to natural science in the way that some 
forms of analytic philosophy have become subject to natural science. I am not arguing 
that Buddhist philosophy should forget about or turn its back on natural science. On 
the other hand, the strong anti-scientific or obscurantist aspects of some types of 
Continental philosophy are also not very helpful. A good example of an effort to find 
the right balance here can be found in the some of the work of the Fourteenth Dalai 
Lama, such as his book The Universe in a Single Atom.
5
 The Dalai Lama is very open 
to science but he evidently feels that while science can perhaps correct Buddhism in 
certain respects (e.g., Abhidharma cosmology) it is not in a position to overrule 
                                                 
5
 I am thinking also of his participation in the “Mind and Life” conferences, and spinoffs such 
Hayward and Varela 2001. 
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Buddhist ideas on all matters.  On Buddhist views on consciousness, for example, he 
says 
 
Even from this brief discussion, it is, I think, clear that the third-person method–which 
has served science so well in so many areas–is inadequate to the explanation of 
consciousness. What is required, if science is successfully to probe the nature of 
consciousness, is nothing short of a paradigm shift. That is, the third-person perspective, 
which can measure phenomena from the point of view of an independent observer, must 
be integrated with a first-person perspective, which will allow the incorporation of 
subjectivity and the qualities that characterize the experience of consciousness. 
 
A comprehensive scientific study of consciousness must therefore embrace both third-
person and first-person methods: it cannot ignore the phenomenological reality of 
subjective experience but must observe all the rules of scientific rigor. So the critical 
question is: Can we envision a scientific methodology for the study of consciousness 
whereby a robust first-person method, which does full justice to the phenomenology of 
experience, can be combined with the objectivist perspective of the study of the brain? 
 Here I feel a close collaboration between modern science and the contemplative 
traditions such as Buddhism, could prove beneficial. (The Dalai Lama 2005, 133-4) 
 
In my view, the combination of the first-person method with the third-person method 
offers the promise of a real advance in the scientific study of consciousness. (The Dalai 
Lama 2005, 142) 
 
These ideas are remarkably similar to some of the points about science that have 
emerged in interactions between analytic and Continental philosophers. 
 
7. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR BALANCE 
  
Our brief reflections on analytic and Continental philosophy, science, and global 
philosophy show how we can avoid the view according to which the sciences and 
technology provide the fundamental or only ways of knowing, understanding, and 
being in the world, and that value natural science and technology above all else.  If 
we should avoid such a scientism it does not at all follow that we should avoid 
science. It is rather just a matter of keeping it in its proper place. Natural science 
reveals and conceals. I think the idea would be to retain and develop what is revealed 
by the sciences, subject to critical scrutiny, responsibility, and broader values, but 
also to cultivate our understanding of the fundamental features of experience that are 
concealed by the sciences, where this is also subject to critical scrutiny, 
responsibility, and broader values.
 
 
     What we arguably need, therefore, is a kind of balance. We do not want to reject 
science but, rather, we would like to develop the right kind of relationship to it. We 
need to get it in perspective. To put it in perspective is at the same time to see its 
limits. On the one hand, there is a tendency toward scientism in many forms of 
analytic philosophy. If scientism is the view that it is only through science and 
technology that we have knowledge or understanding of anything then it is an 
21 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011)  TIESZEN 
exclusionary view. There is a kind of reductionism at work in some quarters of 
science in which anything not reducible to scientific knowledge is to be rejected. Of 
course one can be more or less hard-nosed about this but there are in fact some very 
hard noses out there. A scientific understanding of Being (or non-Being) on which 
one embraced the abstractions inherent in the scientific worldview and then either 
forgot about or covered over what was left behind by the abstractions is, by intention 
or not, a kind of eliminative reductionism. It is a reductionism that can be understood 
in terms of the part-whole scheme outlined above.          
  On the other hand, the ideas I have expressed do not imply that we ought to 
rebound into an anti-scientific or anti-technology stance. Science and technology, in 
addition to having the potential to provide enormous practical benefits to humanity, 
can provide an important corrective to the many possible interpretations of the world 
that involve superstition, credulousness, religious intolerance, and the like. Science 
and technology can instill a healthy skepticism. Skepticism about the claims that the 
earth is flat or that the universe is only several thousand years old, for example, is a 
healthy skepticism.  A scientific worldview can also, however, issue in an unhealthy 
skepticism that would have us deny a place for other important features of our world.  
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ABSTRACT: This paper argues that a number of entrenched posthumanist positions are 
seriously flawed as a result of their dependence on a technical interpretive approach that 
creates more problems than it solves. During the course of our discussion we consider in 
particular the question of personhood. After all, until we can determine what it means to be a 
person we cannot really discuss what it means to improve a person. What kinds of 
enhancements would even constitute improvements? This in turn leads to an examination of 
the technical model of analysis and the recurring tendency to approach notions like 
personhood using this technical model. In looking to sketch a Heideggerian account of 
personhood, we are reaffirming what we take to be a Platonic skepticism concerning 
technical models of inquiry when it comes to certain subjects. Finally we examine the 
question as to whether the posthumanist looks to apply technology‟s benefits in ways that we 
have reflectively determined to be useful or desirable or whether it is technology itself (or to 
speak as Heidegger would – the “essence” of technology) which prompts many 
posthumanists to rely on an excessively reductionist view of the human being. 
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A significant number of Posthumanists
1
 advocate the techno-scientific enhancement 
of various human cognitive and physical capacities. Recent trends in posthumanist 
theory have witnessed the collective emergence, in particular, of a series of 
analytically oriented philosophers as part of the Future of Humanity Institute at  
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1
 The term itself [posthumanism] would clearly have troubled Heidegger, and without getting ahead of 
ourselves, he would, no doubt, insist that the very term was another symptom of the unshakeable 
dominion of Gestell/Enframing. The term “posthumanism” is an umbrella term covering a series of 
related movements. The key arguments in this paper are aimed, predominantly, at the movement 
within posthumanist theory which is often referred to as “Transhumanism”. At the forefront of that 
movement are a series of analytic scholars working at The Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford. 
However, since a number of our arguments can be thought to apply to other types of posthumanism, 
especially when it comes to the question of technology and “Enframing”, we will use the term 
“posthumanism” rather than switching back and forth between posthumanism and transhumanism. 
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Oxford. According to one of the most well known of these philosophers, some of the 
gravest problems that beleaguer us as human beings involve our shortcomings as 
physical and emotional creatures susceptible to unhappiness, senescence and death. 
These posthumanists are committed to finding, in short, a cure for the human 
condition.
2
 And yet, the human condition, that is, what it means to be a human, more 
specifically, a human person, is precisely what they fail to address
3
: 
 
With continuing advances in science and technology, people are beginning to realize that 
some of the basic parameters of the human condition might be changed in the future. One 
important way in which the human condition could be changed is through the 
enhancement of basic human capacities. (Bostrom and Roache 2007, 1) 
 
Some of the “basic parameters” that posthumanists have in mind here relate to our 
mortality while they advocate the extension of human lifespan indefinitely. In the 
same paper it is noted that  
 
Were it not for aging, our risk of dying in any given year might be like that of somebody 
in their late teens or early twenties. Life expectancy would then be around 1,000 
years….In other words, retarding senescence would enable us to grow older without 
aging. Instead of seeing our health peak within the first few decades of life before 
gradually declining, we could remain at our fittest and healthiest indefinitely. For many, 
this represents a wonderful opportunity to experience, learn, and achieve many things that 
are simply not possible given current human life expectancy. (Op.cit., 4) 
 
This aspect of posthumanist theory, in particular, shall concern us in what follows. 
What the posthumanist routinely overlooks in their refutation of objections to their 
proposals is the question of where one‟s sense of personhood would come from were 
the temporal backdrop of our radical finitude to be omitted from our reckoning. In 
suggesting that there are aspects of the human condition that may well change at our 
current rate of technological progress, posthumanists fail to address the question as to 
what makes the human condition meaningful or worthwhile to begin with. At best, 
they pay lip service to the importance of our emotional well-being without 
acknowledging the role played by temporality in shaping our affective experience. In 
focusing on various aspects of human well-being, all of which are aspects of our 
emotional well-being in some shape or form, they fail to look at the temporal context 
within which affectivity occurs and look on the various aspects of being human in an 
atemporal vacuum. For instance, if someone suggests that part of what gives our lives 
meaning are the attempts to complete certain projects within a certain time-frame, the 
post-humanist suggests that if one were to exist indefinitely, one would simply have 
more time to complete more projects. This misses the point hopelessly; our various 
                                                 
2
 This condition, moreover, is all too often described in terms of an affliction to be treated rather than a 
gift to be celebrated. 
3
 Some of the features of our condition which they wish to overcome are in fact constitutive of any 
conception of the human condition and concomitant account of personhood or human flourishing to 
begin with. 
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projects are in significant part infused with meaning and urgency because of the fact 
that there are very distinct temporal limits to what we can achieve. That is not to say 
that a life without temporal limits cannot have meaning, but surely that is one of the 
things which needs to be looked at. That is, if the lives we currently lead are run 
through with a temporal character, then what we have to think about are not the 
specifics of particular enhancement technologies, as Bostrom and others recommend, 
rather what should concern us is the question as to where a non-temporal account of 
personhood would come from, or upon what it would be based. And, before we can 
even begin to address that question, more time needs to be devoted to the question of 
how temporality conditions any current conception of personhood we may have.  
  The analytic approach to the question of posthumanism then, though the analysts 
have yet to realize it, has run aground; they are at something of an interpretive 
impasse, one that was inevitable given some of their presuppositions. One of the most 
problematic of the posthumanist‟s presuppositions, one which we will concentrate on 
in this paper, is the belief that the notion of personhood is well established as part of 
the backdrop to their own recommendations concerning a series of improvements to 
human persons which will issue in a post-human person. By ignoring the inescapably 
temporal constitution of personhood/personal identity, however, the posthumanist 
leaves their recommendations for the improvement of human persons open to the 
charge of being arbitrary. 
  The general strategy in this paper is indebted to a certain theoretical skepticism 
(with respect to morality) clearly evident in a number of Plato‟s dialogues. Questions 
as to what it is to be virtuous or just or good remain those for which Plato seems to 
harbour the least theoretical confidence in the dialogues, at least when it comes to 
subjecting them to the theoretical or technical model of the exact sciences. We 
redeploy this Platonic skepticism then, arguing that the technical language of the 
exact sciences (which Plato undermines with respect to its effectiveness when it 
comes to ethics, for example) simply is not suited to many of the problems and 
dilemmas raised by the issue of posthumanism. This can be characterized then as an 
attempt to offer a deconstructive, continental response to a series of analytic 
arguments, since the advocates of contemporary posthumanist theory we are targeting 
(again, specifically in the transhumanist sense) operate self-consciously within the 
analytic tradition. That does not reflect any inveterate bias or preference for the 
continental over the analytic approach in general.
4
 Rather, in this instance, the 
deconstructive purgative of a continental critique unearths a major blind-spot in the 
analytic treatment of posthumanism. Our efforts here may issue in a kind of Platonic 
aporia; nevertheless, we should be understood as at least trying to assist future efforts 
to pick a path out of the theoretical morass which currently benights this debate by 
                                                 
4
 It would be disingenuous to suggest that my own philosophical background is straightforwardly 
neutral since my most significant work to date has been largely devoted to Heidegger interpretation. 
Notwithstanding, I would argue that my attitude is more inclusive than many of the hardliners on either 
side would countenance. The stand-off between the continental and analytic traditions is a rather 
unfortunate intellectual development while the champions around which these partisan adversaries 
rally are often not nearly so easily pigeon-holed! 
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identifying some of the unhelpful theoretical detritus which may clutter such paths. If 
the posthumanist can absorb some of the criticisms we offer regarding their failure to 
recognize the temporal constitution of personhood and the problematic nature of 
contemporary conceptions of technology, they might yet be able to offer more 
reflective arguments against the backdrop of an intuitively plausible, reconsidered 
account of personhood. 
  There are a plethora of questions and considerations that the notion of 
posthumanity brings to the table that remind us of just how prescient Bernard 
Williams was in his conviction that returning to the work of the ancient Greeks might 
well be the only way we can begin to appreciate the depth and difficulty of certain 
contemporary philosophical problems: 
 
This is not just the piety of philosophy toward its history. There is a special reason for 
it…The idea is certainly not that the demands of the modern world on ethical thought are 
no different from those of the ancient world. On the contrary, my conclusion is that the 
demands of the modern world on ethical thought are unprecedented, and the ideas of 
rationality embodied in most contemporary moral philosophy cannot meet them; but 
some extension of ancient thought, greatly modified, might be able to do so. (Williams 
1993, v) 
 
The very notion of “enhancement” involves significant presuppositions. When we 
speak of “improving” people, or making the kinds of improvements that might lead to 
a better person, we presuppose an account of personhood beyond the mere 
classification “homo sapiens”. After all, being human on its own, in that sense, would 
appear to be a morally neutral notion; in the context of what is right and wrong – the 
ability to suffer or feel pain would seem to be more relevant. And the capacity to 
suffer is one shared by all kinds of non-human animals. The posthumanist might look 
to immediately forestall these kinds of reservations, and some indeed have, insisting 
that the fact that such notions (e.g. personhood) are difficult to nail down is no 
argument against the relevance of future humanity‟s enhancements being viewed 
from an ethical perspective every bit as much as the current human model. The 
problem for the posthumanist here is that that type of move issues in something of a 
pyrrhic victory. The fact that we may fail to offer a comprehensive, axiomatic 
definition of personhood, which Jane English (1975) famously described in another 
context as a “cluster concept”, is not in fact a good reason for choosing any arbitrary 
cluster of concepts whatsoever! Moreover, if one grants as much but then attempts to 
come up with a viable definition, then one is back in philosophy‟s proverbial gutter of 
explanatory poverty trying to find a place to start. And of course, all too often, critics 
have looked to begin in the wrong places and with the wrong kind of language. So 
while we may concede that one needs to begin to appreciate that change is coming 
and that we are required to think about such change – arbitrary, makeshift foundations 
for evaluating change are no foundations at all.
5
 Plato‟s dialogues represent a salutary 
                                                 
5
 Nick Bostrom‟s Future of Humanity Institute professes to be the intellectual centre that will serve this 
important function. However, in the main, the arguments and findings that have emerged from the 
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reminder of the perils of trying to transpose the theoretical/technical template of the 
more exact sciences onto questions which don‟t admit of that sort of treatment.6 We 
routinely transpose the techne model of the exact sciences onto questions that do not 
have the same rationalist/idealist backdrop and we end up philosophically marooned. 
What is needed, however, is an entirely different approach, not variations on the 
technical one. And such an approach, I would submit, is part of what Heidegger is 
trying to pave the way for. Granted, Heidegger never sees himself as answering 
questions such as “what is virtue?”, but he certainly can be credited with an attempt 
to undermine the ratio-technical approach to human life from the very beginning; 
                                                                                                                                           
institute lack objectivity in that the dice are heavily loaded against critics of posthumanism. In paying 
the merest lip service to the concerns of critics of posthumanism and annihilating straw-man 
arguments, they routinely dodge the more serious philosophical problems that need to be addressed. 
Most problematic is the institute‟s failure to address the question as to what personhood itself entails. 
Moreover, Bostrom repeatedly points to the fact that the difficulties involved do not, of necessity, 
constitute an argument against the enhancements proposed by posthumanists: “In order to decide what 
changes in a person‟s mood or personality count as improvements, then, we must confront questions 
like: By what standard do we assess improvements or the reverse in cases where a person‟s mood or 
personality does not have a serious adverse effect on their life? Is it even plausible to claim that there 
could be such a standard? If so, what is the best guide to what the standard is and how it applies in a 
particular case: the opinion of the subject, the opinions of those who interact with the subject, or 
something else? The importance of addressing such questions does not entail that mood and 
personality enhancement is impossible or inadvisable; but a certain amount of philosophical reflection 
and analysis is required if we are to gain genuine benefits from such technology.” (Bostrom and 
Roache 2007) The problem however is that, in the same paper for example, Bostrom and Roache 
proceed to describe various different types of enhancement individually in the context of a rather 
nebulous, undefined notion of human flourishing without ever actually offering any account of what it 
means to be a person such that we could begin to see what it might mean to improve such a person – 
what it would be for a person to flourish in the first place. Rather they simply look at the mind and 
body through a somewhat hackneyed technological, reductionist lens which creates more problems 
than it purports to solve. That is not to say that the Institute is engaged in a dead-born enterprise. 
Bostrom and his colleagues should be commended for looking to tackle some of the most pressing 
questions of our time. Notwithstanding, there are a series of underlying presuppositions shared by 
scholars at the Institute that reflect a disappointingly inflexible ideological platform of their own. 
6
 Plato‟s Meno, for example, can be read as a sustained meditation on the shortcomings of the techne 
model when it comes to the messy matter of the “science of human affairs”. A number of 
commentators who subscribe to what David Roochnik (1996) dubs the SAT view (standard account of 
techne) insist that Plato changed tack through the middle and late dialogues and became a theoretical 
skeptic with respect to morality thereby supplanting the programmatic, optimistic and idealistic moral 
outlook of the early dialogues. Other commentators, including Roochnik, argue that Plato maintained a 
consistently skeptical stance concerning the suitability of the techne model for questions pertaining to 
the good life from the very beginning. This of course is to advance what some might call a continental 
interpretation of Plato. But, in a sense, such characterizations are unavoidable since the way we read 
Plato, in itself, reflects the fault line that has seemingly sundered our tradition in the shape of an 
interpretive series of choices we make when reading even the great inaugurators of that tradition. In 
other words, a version of our analytic – continental stand-off is evident in our attempts to divine the 
meaning or implications of Plato‟s dialogues. That is not to suggest that Plato, for example, should be 
read as a continental philosopher. That kind of anachronistic approach to Plato or Aristotle is 
nonsensical but it is one imposed on us by the intransigence of analytic Plato scholars. What a number 
of recent Plato scholars have tried to show is that much of Plato‟s work can fruitfully be read as 
presaging some important, putatively continental approaches to philosophical questions. 
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indeed the account of authenticity in one of his first major philosophical publications, 
Being and Time, can justifiably be described as such. We need an alternative 
launching pad for the notion of personhood to the technical/reductionist model which 
typically leaves us with a hopeless and grotesquely vivisected scrapheap where once 
there was, albeit vaguely outlined, a more holistic sense of personhood. Admittedly, 
Heidegger repeatedly insists that nowhere does he offer an ethics (and he is keen to 
remind us that neither does he offer a philosophical anthropology, even as early as 
Being and Time).
7
 We might say that this is due to his belief that a term like “ethics”, 
generally speaking, already carries a metaphysical legacy which he is trying to 
overcome. But that is not to say that in outlining Heidegger‟s account of what it is to 
be an authentic being, interacting with other beings as similarly authentic in the truth 
of their own being, we cannot begin to trace the basis for an alternative conception of 
personhood, albeit one which Heidegger himself refuses to sketch. 
 
1. PROBLEMS WITH THE ANATOMICAL APPROACH TO PERSONHOOD 
 
Personhood, like other notions that are close to us, is taken so much for granted as to 
seem invisible; the familiarity of such concepts breeds a collective indifference or 
insensibility.
8
 And yet, when it comes to properly examining the question of 
personhood, as Jane English argues, we struggle to come up with an exhaustive list of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. The mere fact of being human will not suffice 
since many people justify abortion to a point on the grounds that the fetus is not yet a 
person and yet they would hardly deny that the same fetuses are human. For those 
familiar with the debates surrounding the question of animal rights and the 
concomitant charge of speciesism, this is also straightforwardly problematic. Given 
the diversity of individuals that constitute the set of humanity, if all that was required 
to be a person was to be human, then all kinds of animals that we would typically 
avoid calling persons would be precluded from being called as much for the simple 
and rather arbitrary reason that they do not happen to belong to our species; there 
would be no further morally significant distinction in terms of intellectual ability or 
emotional intelligence, the ability to suffer and so on. This, of course, entangles us in 
the question of speciesism and without moving down that road, one can already 
anticipate the enormous difficulties we might face here.
9
 Pain and suffering on their 
                                                 
7
 Heidegger could not be clearer on this issue in Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning). In the 
“Preview” he repeatedly dispels what he variously refers to as moral-anthropological and existentiell-
anthropological misreadings of Being and Time and bemoans the fact that the “temptation is still close 
at hand to take the entire deliberation in the first half of Being and Time as confined to the range of an 
anthropology, only with an other orientation.” (Heidegger 1999, 48) There are other comments 
concerning his efforts to steer clear of ethics in “Letter on Humanism”. (Heidegger 1998, 268). 
8
 Indeed we could line this posture up with what has been called the “false conceit of knowledge” of 
the interlocutors that Socrates faces in a number of the dialogues. (See Benson 1990) 
9
 This raises the question, for instance, as to whether the enhancements that the posthumanist advocates 
with respect to humans should be made available to animals. That is, suppose we have a scenario 
whereby a medical breakthrough is made such that we can enhance the brains of human individuals 
that would otherwise be left severely mentally handicapped. Presumably, many of us would be willing 
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own will not prove definitive either since too many non-human creatures share this 
capacity as well. Eventually we are forced to concede that the notion of personhood is 
a somewhat elusive concept.  
  Be that as it may, part of the reason that personhood appears to be a “cluster 
concept” that resists attempts to define it relates to the technical, reductionist 
approach itself. The anatomizing of personhood does a certain amount of violence to 
the structural integrity of the whole. We cannot be broken down so easily into parts, 
nor can we be simply reassembled from those discrete elements; but that does not 
mean that we are non-coherent amalgams of disparate elements. It is not just the 
posthumanist who looks to dissect our personhood in this way of course – they rely 
on a technical interpretive approach that is already entrenched. However, in 
advocating specific enhancements of discrete components, divorced from any holistic 
context, they are essentially prescribing treatment and improvements for severed 
limbs rather than intact bodies. The presuppositions that undergird the analytic 
approach to this kind of question then are in fact the major source of their own 
theoretical confusion. 
  The attempts to define personhood (as is seen repeatedly in debates concerning 
abortion or the treatment of animals) tend to founder on the issue of limit cases. In 
other words, various creatures that fit the bill as/answer to the description “human 
beings” often fail to meet all of the criteria that supposedly constitute personhood. In 
a way, we are dealing with the kind of problem faced by anyone pushed to provide 
Socratic definitions for non-analytic subjects. For example, when it comes to what a 
tree is or what the definition of a tree is, we will find that no list of criteria will ever 
prove definitive. However, we seem to remain, for the most part, epistemically and 
practically unfazed by this shortcoming.
10
 There is little or no moral significance, for 
                                                                                                                                           
to concede that there is nothing morally dubious in intervening in such cases and enhancing these same 
individuals. The posthumanist might go further and suggest that there is no morally significant 
difference between that kind of intervention and those that they are discussing regarding the cognitive 
enhancement of humans with what we might currently deem median cognitive capacities. We are faced 
however with a possible question concerning speciesism in a different setting. If scientific research 
could potentially lead to the cognitive transformation of dogs, for example, into creatures that would 
be as sophisticated cognitively as a human being with what is currently an average IQ; would we see 
fit to enhance any dog we could in the same way we would the handicapped humans and, if not, why? I 
suspect that this is the kind of dilemma that the future humanist would be willing to concede but would 
rather avoid. Notwithstanding, I don‟t see it as an argument against posthumanism per se. 
10
 Though, this same difficulty with respect to trees reveals again how the search for technical 
definitions is not always the best strategy; and yet we cannot simply decide that trees can no longer be 
spoken of. Socrates repeatedly exhorts his interlocutors to offer technical, analytic definitions of 
ethical terms in Plato‟s dialogues, but one wonders what his interlocutors might have said if they were 
discussing whether or not a forest of trees was aesthetically pleasing and Socrates refused to be drawn 
on the subject before they had offered a comprehensive and exhaustive definition of the word “tree”. 
As it happens, this issue has led to legal headaches from time to time since finding an overarching 
definition of a tree proves next to impossible. I recently discovered a newspaper article which reported 
on a case where a presiding judge had taken twelve thousand words to “define a tree”. Justice Cranston 
was interested in the legal definition of a tree in terms of tree preservation orders and ruled in the case 
in question that a sapling clearly counted as a tree and that a previous ruling which determined that a 
tree‟s trunk had to reach a certain minimum diameter in order to count as a tree was erroneous: “with 
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example, riding on the question as to what constitutes a tree. And, if Socrates himself 
were to push us for the definition of a tree, we might concede eventually that we 
cannot offer a definition of a tree in the same way that we might be able to furnish a 
definition of something in geometry which deals with self-evidence or analytic truths. 
All of Socrates‟ vexations concerning the definition of a tree would not stop us from 
saying whether a tree in our garden is green or tall or deciduous and so on. We would 
continue to speak of trees rather than passing over them in silence even though we 
could not offer the definition of a tree which Socrates would wish to identify before 
proceeding. The same is not true when it comes to the question of personhood, which 
has been the subject of some of the more hotly contested debates in contemporary 
moral philosophy. We have continually struggled and failed to provide exact and 
exhaustive definitions of personhood and we don‟t seem content to accept the notion 
of personhood as loosely defined or non-technical. And, to make matters worse, the 
posthumanist, incognisant of this difficulty it would seem, routinely proceeds with a 
half-baked, pseudo-technical understanding of personhood as though it were 
indubitable. 
  Granted, we typically don‟t need to distinguish between terms like “human being” 
and “person” in order to make sense of experience. We are not normally crippled with 
perplexity when someone uses these terms; indeed, most of us would tend to treat the 
                                                                                                                                           
tree preservation orders there are no limitations in terms of size for what is to be treated as a tree. In 
other words, saplings are trees”. (Adams) From there I began to scan through various textbooks and 
studies of trees, as I could lay my hands on them, only to find that, for the most part, the subject of 
these various studies – the tree/trees, remained undefined or rather loosely defined. Eventually, I found 
the following insightful and, dare I say it, philosophically penetrating entry in Colliers Encyclopedia, 
Vol 22: 
 
    TREE, a perennial woody plant that typically [not necessarily] has a single upright stem, or trunk. A 
more precise definition is difficult to formulate because of the range of sizes and the diversity of 
habits of plants considered by various people to be trees. For example, banana plants often are 
referred to as trees, but they are herbaceous rather than woody. Many previous definitions have 
included the condition that the trunk of a tree divides into successively more numerous and smaller 
segments, called branches and twigs, which bear leaves, or that trees have distinct crowns of foliage. 
A palm tree, however, has an unbranched trunk topped by a cluster of large leaves; and the woody 
trunk of the giant tree cactus, or saguaro, may have one or a few thick branches but is leafless. 
         Most definitions include a statement on height, but the minimum height to qualify as a tree 
ranges from 8 to 20 feet in the view of different authors. Some definitions pertain to individual 
plants, but others pertain to species. Thus, a low plant at timberline on a high mountain or in the 
Arctic may be considered a tree because it belongs to a species whose individuals usually grow to 
large size. In a favorable site the plant has the inherent capacity to grow to large size, but adverse 
environmental conditions at timberline limit its height to a few feet. Other plants ranging from a few 
inches to several feet tall, particularly many forms propagated by nurserymen, and bonsai dwarfs, 
are considered trees because they have single trunks and conspicuous crowns. A large plant that 
would be recognized as a tree by any of the many definitions began growth as a seedling and 
gradually grew to large size. Was it a tree from the time it germinated, or from the time it reached a 
height of 8, 10, 12, 15, or 20 feet? While these are legitimate questions, they have no scientific 
answers. Although rigid definitions may be required for certain undertakings, „tree‟ is a concept that 
always will be interpreted more liberally by some people than by others.  (McCormick 1972, 448; 
my emphases). 
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terms more or less synonymously. But when faced with the moral dilemmas alluded 
to above, we have persistently looked to determine the meaning of “personhood” in 
the same way that Socrates‟ interlocutors try to satisfy the latter‟s demands for 
technical definitions. The reason we have found ourselves dissatisfied with the 
biological definition of a human being as sufficient for personhood, for instance, 
relates to the fact that that definition is of little use when it comes to the moral 
positions that look to stake their claims with varying standards or accounts of 
personhood.
11
 We find that we can offer a suitably adequate definition of the term 
“human being”12 then, but we will begin to struggle when it comes to the term 
“person”. Most likely, we would begin with the assumption that a person is a human 
being. But, without moving too far in any particular direction, we already know that 
the mere fact of being human will often not do enough work for an account of 
personhood, enough work, that is, such as to resolve all of the difficulties that emerge 
in moral debates. To put things rather simply, any attempt to define personhood 
typically moves in one of two directions: commentators either try to lower things 
down to such widely held common denominators of human experience that the 
classification personhood cannot justifiably be thought to not apply to all kinds of 
non-human animals, or else, in the attempt to avoid this result by establishing the 
exclusively human character of personhood, commentators propose criteria which 
would ultimately preclude all kinds of human beings whose personhood we are loath 
to relinquish. There are many human beings that, for one reason or another, do not 
have the capacity to function, for example, as moral agents and yet we would still 
classify them as “persons”. For example, a severely retarded human being, or a very 
young infant would not qualify as a moral agent and yet we still count them as 
persons. So, while many people are moral agents, there are lots of people who are not, 
thus moral agency is certainly not the criterion required.   
  Jane English demonstrates effectively how attempts to come up with an 
exhaustive list of necessary and sufficient conditions regarding the notion of 
personhood are bound to fail and characterizes the notion of personhood as a “cluster 
concept”, which is a useful enough image. English stops short of suggesting, 
however, that the attempt to find a technical/theoretical definition is a major source of 
the relevant difficulties to begin with. In other words, she seems to simply accept that 
we begin with a concept (personhood), of which we have a vague, average 
understanding before then attempting to offer a more technical, comprehensive, 
scientifically adequate account when pushed. In demonstrating how these efforts 
typically unravel, however, we also need to address the question as to where the 
vague, average understanding of personhood comes from, and whether or not there 
are other ways of thinking about the concept that do not require us to simply render it 
a murky puddle of notions, or a cluster concept without any cohesive agent. In other 
words, what if it is the technical approach itself that renders the notion of personhood 
                                                 
11
 For a discussion of this issue, among others, in the context of a critical overview of the notion of 
personhood in moral philosophy see S. F. Sapontzis 1981. 
12
 Presumably we will offer some generic account of what the term „homo sapiens‟ involves. 
32 
 
 
Comparative Philosophy 2.2 (2011)  O‟BRIEN 
as such? What if this is the wrong type of approach? What if we do not simply accept 
the Socratic challenge at the outset? Is that perhaps what Plato was trying to suggest 
in some of his dialogues? That is, that sometimes the technical approach (i.e. the 
conviction that we must begin with a technical definition) simply won‟t work when it 
comes to certain types of questions. Then how might we begin?  
 
2. A NON-ANATOMICAL ACCOUNT OF PERSONHOOD 
 
We seem to have some basic sense of what being a person means, it is perhaps 
imprecise, it maybe begins to creak if we try to establish moral principles of inclusion 
and exclusion upon it which typically involves trying to beef up the technical side of 
the definition. But before trying to supplement the definition in that fashion, what if 
we examine where our immediate, non-technical, average sense of personhood comes 
from? Clearly being biologically human, in and of itself, doesn‟t seem to necessarily 
play a major conceptual role at the pre-reflective stage; we are not interested in the 
biological backdrop to personhood in this context. We are usually thinking more in 
terms of a site of experiences, in short, our emotional experience. Take, for example, 
the frequency with which we personify all kinds of non-human creatures. Even in our 
fantastical conjectures regarding extra-terrestrials in science fiction we tend to 
personify them in some way. When we personify an alien, for example, for the most 
part, we tend to focus on their affective capacities, that is, we usually take it as a 
given that they are cognitively advanced, but we are interested in whether or not they 
would have an affectivity that would allow for empathy or mutual identification. The 
kinds of questions we seem inexorably drawn to involve how they feel about things. 
In other words, will they respond affectively to situations as we do? Our tendency is 
to speculate about them as emotional beings. A similar trend is noticed in other 
popular science fiction genres, for example, cinematic treatments of artificial 
intelligence. In movies that tackle the question of Artificial Intelligence, the 
overriding concern of the narratives typically relates to the issue of emotional 
experience. Much of what we might once have been impressed by in terms of 
computation and physical strength can be understood readily enough in terms of 
computers and machines with painted faces. What ultimately fascinates us is the idea 
that something that is not human could have something comparable to our emotional 
experience and thereby the ability to experience the world in all of its affective depth 
the way we do. The focus is nearly always on the personhood of these non-human 
entities which is both measured and attested to by their capacity for emotional 
response. Ultimately, fascination with superhuman mental or physical prowess is a 
response to novelty and is rarely the focus of these stories; the meat of these stories 
involves emotional relationships and how we in turn come to identify machines as 
people and no longer as mere machines. Again and again writers, film-makers and 
story tellers return to this theme of human emotions as being central to any account of 
humaneness and empathy, in short, the ability to treat others as persons deserving of 
respect in their own right. The specifics of their genetic or biological or material 
composition are deemed irrelevant to the question of personhood, the issue of 
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personhood relates exclusively to the idea of an awareness that appreciates and feels 
what we ordinarily call human emotions. Of course, from a Heideggerian standpoint, 
there is a fundamental misapprehension on the part of those who speculate in these 
ways concerning affectivity in that the temporality or possibly non-temporal nature of 
these creatures is largely ignored, where, for Heidegger, this is central to any account 
of our affective understanding, self-identification and projection. As such, the 
supposition that commensurate emotional awareness would develop in suitably 
intelligent non-human machines, for example, misses the historical constitution of 
human interpretation, understanding, in short, how time conditions the way we feel. 
Leaving this important criticism to one side, for the moment, we simply wish to 
establish that affectivity, however it is understood, is central to any account or 
understanding of personhood. The question as to how time or temporality should be 
brought to bear on any account of affectivity is something we will treat of shortly. 
  Consider our fascination with the biographies of famous people. More often than 
not, what intrigues us most is the possibility of a glimpse inside their mind, and this 
usually means that we are interested in them as emotional beings. When reading 
accounts of Beethoven‟s life, for example, we wonder what kind of person he was? 
What must it have been like to be Beethoven? How did Beethoven experience a world 
which, in certain respects, we share? One might object that this is not necessarily the 
case when one reads about Hitler, for example, and yet, in attempting to render Hitler 
as a creature we cannot empathize with, a non-person, if you like, who lacks the 
personhood that normal people identify with, we are simultaneously acknowledging 
the primacy of the affective in how we relate to and interpret the world and other 
people. It is through the affective that we relate, that we interpret. This goes some 
way toward explaining, perhaps, the recurring tendency to depict figures like Hitler as 
diabolical creatures that lack any vestige of personhood. We sidestep many of the 
discomfiting issues involved by simply suppressing or denying the personhood of 
such figures. 
  So, what can we discern here? Well, in short, the central role occupied by the 
emotions – the affective. It is at an emotional register that we have our most 
immediate sense of something like personhood and perhaps that should also be our 
clue when it comes to figuring out how we should proceed. If we begin to think of 
ourselves, or of persons, as the beings that feel in various ways, then we might begin 
to see a way forward. As with the attempts of Platonic characters responding to the 
Socratic challenge, the attempts to use the technical model are frustrated when we 
look for axiomatic definitions of personhood. The analytical incisions of the technical 
approach will not uncover the hidden glue of personhood after dissecting its „pieces‟ 
anymore than the surgeon‟s scalpel will fix a plethora of psychological problems that 
ail us. To dis-integrate something is not necessarily to understand how it is integrated, 
particularly if it is not a machine of our own design or construction and indeed is not 
well captured by the machine analogy to begin with.
13
 One can already anticipate a 
                                                 
13
 As Schechtman writes, when discussing the shortcomings of psychological-continuity theory: “The 
pieces that make up a person‟s psychology, must, to fulfil this purpose, be viewed to be as discrete and 
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move that is available here whereby the posthumanist concedes this and says, “okay, 
what if we only deal for now with conditions that are either necessary or sufficient or 
both and determine whether or not we can improve them in ways that are 
uncontroversial?” And of course one can quickly turn a slippery slope around and 
suggest that from there it is an easy, well-lubricated slide toward the more fantastical 
interventions advocated by many posthumanists. But this is merely an example of 
what we shall discuss below regarding Heidegger‟s worries over our commitment, if 
not enslavement, to a technological filtering lens through which we view, or perhaps, 
process the world. Looked at in a technical way, if we take any one of the necessary 
or sufficient conditions of personhood on their own, we cannot identify any particular 
one of them as definitive or constitutive of personhood and no particular assembly or 
arrangement of a list of conditions taken collectively would be either exhaustive or 
definitive either. That is, any particular feature of personhood which the posthumanist 
would look to enhance or improve would be either a necessary or sufficient condition 
of personhood as part of an account that actually lacks a definition of personhood. 
This lack, moreover, is a result of the reductive, technical approach to a subject that 
requires a rather different one that takes note of the pre-reflective, affective backdrop 
to our ordinary, everyday sense of personhood. 
 
3. HEIDEGGER, HISTORY AND PERSONHOOD 
 
The question of history was one that Heidegger had already identified as crucial 
before his earliest encounters with Husserl or his confrontation with Kant‟s critical 
philosophy. In letters to his then fiancé, Elfride, Heidegger (still only in his mid-20s) 
was already quite critical of two of the most important influences on his early 
philosophical vision for what he took to be a fatal shortcoming: their entire neglect of 
the question of history. Of course, Heidegger does not mean something so simple as 
knowing the events that make up one‟s own external life in chronological order, much 
less significant facts and dates in school books. Rather Heidegger means a more 
primordial notion of history for a creature that lives in the liminally projected 
certainty of its temporal limits at any given moment. In 1915 the young philosopher 
was already critical of certain aspects of Kant‟s critical philosophy as evidenced in a 
letter to Elfride: 
 
Today I know that there can be a philosophy of vibrant life [des lebendigen Lebens] – 
that I can declare war on rationalism right through to the bitter end – without falling 
victim to the anathema of unscientific thought – I can – I must – & so I‟m today faced by 
the necessity of the problem: how is philosophy to be produced as living truth & as 
creation of the personality valuably and powerfully.  
                                                                                                                                           
detachable as are the planks of a ship or the grains of sand in a heap. It is because psychological-
continuity theorists are trying to force the insights gained from consideration of questions of self-
knowledge and responsibility into the mold of questions of the persistence of material objects that they 
are forced to view psychological states as atomic, isolable, and in principle independent of the subject 
who experiences them – a view that I have argued to be highly implausible.” (Schechtman 1990, 89) 
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The Kantian question is not only wrongly put – it fails to capture the problem; this is 
much richer and deeper. 
We must not give our heroes stones instead of bread when they come back hungry from 
the battlefield, not unreal and dead categories, not shadowy forms and bloodless 
compartments in which to keep a life ground down by rationalism neat and tidy and let it 
moulder away. (Heidegger, 2008: 17) 
 
A couple of years later, revealing his earliest impressions of Husserl, Heidegger has 
the following to say to Elfride in a letter dated Whit Sunday, 1917: 
 
I cannot accept Husserl‟s phen[omenology]. as a final position even if it joins up with 
philos. – because in its approach & accordingly in its goal it is too narrow & bloodless & 
because such an approach cannot be made absolute. Life is too rich & and too great – 
thus for relativities that seek to come close to its meaning (that of the absolute) in the 
form of philos. systems, it‟s a question of discovering the liberating path in an absolute 
articulation of relativity....Since I‟ve been lecturing, up to now I‟ve constantly 
experienced these sudden reversals – until „historical man‟ came to me in a flash this 
winter. (Heidegger 2008, 33)  
 
In both of these passages Heidegger emphasizes the lack (in Kant and Husserl) of 
what he was to see as central to his own project: the historical situatedness of the 
human being. Our history, in Heidegger‟s sense, is constitutive of the way we 
perceive and interpret and allows us a multi-dimensional vision of life as opposed to 
the overly contrived, lifeless nature of other accounts. And, we might say, it should 
form part of any conception of what an authentic person is like and what their life 
involves.  
  For Heidegger, what is constitutive, at bottom, of the way we experience 
existence is the fact that things matter to us; that we have aims and desires infused 
with varying levels of affective urgency. At the heart of the dynamic structure of our 
existence are affective moorings which are conditioned by the ultimate existential 
anchor, time or temporality. The fact that being for us is set against the backdrop of 
the possibility of not-being, that is, of a previous having been and not having been 
and a future to both be in and eventually not be in, is the ultimate determining 
condition behind our entire interpretive apparatus. We are facing an important 
question in this regard with respect to the ultimately tragic nature of existence and 
how much of what we currently hold dear and value as rudiments of existence are 
conditioned by our appreciation of a tragic fate which we dread.
14
 There are a whole 
                                                 
14
 I am thinking here of Heidegger‟s treatment of the tragic, inexorable nature of our situation in 
Introduction to Metaphysics. Take for example passages such as the following: “There is only one 
thing against which all violence-doing directly shatters. That is death. It is an end beyond all 
completion, a limit beyond all limits. Here there is no breaking forth and breaking up, no capturing and 
subjugating. But this un-canny thing, which sets us simply and suddenly out from everything homely 
once and for all, is not a special event that must also be mentioned among others, because it, too, 
ultimately does occur. The human being has no way out in the face of death, not only when it is time to 
die, but constantly and essentially. Insofar as humans are, they stand in the no-exit of death. Thus 
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range of emotions that we cherish as colourful threads in the tapestry that is our 
identity which are conditioned by the limits of our existence. They do not seem to be 
demoted or diminished by medical advances that allow people to live longer now than 
they did, for example, in Shakespeare‟s time. When we read Shakespeare‟s Sonnet 
No. 60, which opens with the lines “Like as the waves make towards the pebbled 
shore/So do our minutes hasten to their end;” we are moved by the familiarity of 
sentiments that echo our own rueful reflections on the transient nature of life.
15
 
Granted, when faced with the imminent loss of life, or indeed our projection of a 
future where we will quite possibly face our demise knowingly, the fact that that 
same feature of our historical identity (namely its temporal limits) is part of what 
makes life as special or significant as it is comes as rather meagre comfort. When we 
reflect on the fact that we are all essentially on death row, we tend to be less prone to 
cavalier, devil-may-care attitudes toward our continued existence. The very notion 
can be deeply, deeply disconcerting. The prospect of being reprieved from so grim a 
fate as the erasure of one‟s own ego or identity can be enormously appealing16; but 
we have to be clear on what life would mean for such a creature, not least since such 
a creature would not be one of us. We are left with the question then: if history is a 
part of our dynamic existential identity, then is the posthumanist ideal one where 
                                                                                                                                           
Being-here is the happening of un-canniness itself. (The happening of uncanniness must for us be 
grounded inceptively as Being-here.)” (Heidegger 2000, 168-169). 
15
 The fact that life expectancy has increased significantly beyond what was typical in Shakespearean 
times then has not altered the fundamentally temporal constitution of our personhood. That is, whether 
the average life expectancy is 30 or 60 or 90 years does not seem to alter the fact that 
temporality/finitude plays a central role in our sense of personhood. The issue of continued attempts to 
improve quality of life and life expectancy then must be distinguished from the fantasy of enhancing 
the species beyond its temporal limits through technology such that the resulting creatures would no 
longer be susceptible to death. That is, they would be temporally limitless creatures, and indeed would 
no longer be human but post or trans human. 
16
 The question as to what ramifications the belief in an afterlife might have for Heidegger‟s account of 
temporality could be seen as bearing directly on our argument. Heidegger argues that our entire 
experience of the world and ourselves, as well as our ability to understand, interpret and project is 
filtered through a temporal lens. The more we examine our projects and the hidden and not so hidden 
structures of our project-oriented lives, the more we see in all of them the constitutive influence of our 
temporality. So how do we reconcile this conviction on Heidegger‟s part (one of his most important 
and enduring insights for many) with the fact that so many people profess to be theists and supposedly 
subscribe to the notion that their ego, or spirit or soul, that thinking and feeling part of themselves, 
doesn‟t vanish as soon as they have shuffled off this mortal coil? If they have such a non-finite view of 
themselves, then how can radical finitude be operative in the way that Heidegger proposes? The fact 
remains, however, that no matter how often we are told of the consolations of faith or religious belief – 
that same, faith-based type of belief does not seem to diminish the fear of death in the great majority of 
people. One might say that people merely fear the unknown in such cases, but I would suggest that that 
is a little obtuse. When it comes down to it, our temporal awareness seems unaffected by any beliefs in 
an afterlife or a life beyond temporality since it is outside the manifold of experience for us. We are 
rather firmly earthed when it comes to our ability to interpret and understand and whether or not we 
hold out hope or belief in some kind of existence subsequent to this one, we are epistemically 
entrenched in the finiteness of this existence – the temporal structure seems ingrained! For an example 
of the ill-conceived lengths some thinkers have gone to in trying to undermine the priority Heidegger 
affords finitude as part of our ability to interpret and understand the world, see Frederick Sontag 1967.  
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history has no end for us and thus loses its essence insofar as our future becomes an 
anchorless horizon of endless existence? Is that the aspiration? I do not pose these 
snidely as rhetorical questions, rather the gravity of such questions and their 
ramifications for how we understand personhood can scarcely be overstated!  
  That is not to suggest that very different types of creatures living very different 
sorts of lives might not have a dignity and worth all their own. But we do have to face 
the question as to what it is that makes this life worthwhile or meaningful and, I 
would submit, our historical situatedness and our finitude are ultimately a major part 
of what constitutes its significance and worth for us. Our existential history is 
affectively and interpretively constitutive. Some may aspire to a ceaseless euphoric 
existence at a level of extreme cognitive functionality
17
; but one wonders as to the all 
too familiar utopian ring to such aspirations. Notwithstanding, even leaving the well-
rehearsed criticisms which typically accompany such suspicions aside – it seems to 
me that we need to get clear on how much of what we currently do take as 
fundamental to our dignity would be made obsolete by certain enhancements. The 
quest for the Holy Grail, the magic elixir or gift of immortal life have ever been 
mainstays of human fantasy, but what kind of effect would such a change actually 
have? Death, that is, our projected temporal finitude, is one of the interpretive anchors 
to our existence. It sets our affective field of vision if you like, sets the manifold into 
limits of sorts. If coming-to-an-end no longer is the converse of coming to be, then 
what kind of effect would this have? It would certainly involve a radical change in 
how we experience life; but of course, we cannot say that it would of necessity be 
bad. The fact that things are this way does not mean that they ought to be this way. 
Nevertheless, a description of what makes life matter to us in such a scenario is still 
                                                 
17
 And yet even moments of intense ecstasy, I would submit, owe part of their allure to their contrast 
with the less intense quality of our daily life. John Stuart Mill himself is critical of the excessively 
hedonistic conception of happiness that utilitarianism was sometimes erroneously characterized as 
aspiring toward. Instead, happiness for him involves a realistic and realizable balance where the high 
points of ecstatic existence are weaved into a life where one is able to maintain something of an even 
keel, a predominance of the active over the passive and the good fortune not to have to endure the trials 
of Priam. Mill is, in this sense, a good old Aristotelian: “If by happiness be meant a continuity of 
highly pleasurable excitement, it is evident enough that this is impossible. A state of exalted pleasure 
lasts only moments, or in some cases, and with some intermissions, hours or days, and is the 
occasional brilliant flash of enjoyment, not its permanent and steady flame. Of this the philosophers 
who have taught that happiness is the end of life were as fully aware as those who taunt them. The 
happiness which they meant was not a life of rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of 
few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures, with a decided predominance of the active over 
the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to expect more from life than it is capable 
of bestowing. A life thus composed, to those who have been fortunate enough to obtain it, has always 
appeared worthy of the name happiness. And such an existence is even now the lot of many, during 
some considerable portion of their lives. The present wretched education and wretched social 
arrangements, are the only real hindrance to its being attainable by almost all.
”
 (Mill 1991, 143-4). Of 
course, we are always going to struggle to offer strictly delimited boundaries or cut-off points with 
respect to these kinds of issues. Asking questions like “how much pleasure is too much pleasure?” 
doesn‟t really make much sense. However, a cognitive enhancement that would allow us to walk 
around the world in a state of unrestrained euphoria…does that strike us as desirable? Surely a part of 
ecstasy involves its rarity and this seems to be something that we collectively cherish. 
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lacking on the posthumanist‟s account. Furthermore, any „values‟ that might be 
espoused as life-affirming or worthwhile are all currently supervened on by our 
thoroughgoing sense of our limited, temporally historical nature; if we were 
temporally limitless creatures, then the way these values retain their significance 
would undoubtedly change as well. Our ability to „be‟ and our concomitant temporal 
limits are constitutive of our ability to feel, to value, to both love and hate! 
  A more realistic immediate possibility, of course, is that we will begin to see the 
continued extension of human life expectancy. We can expect that centenarians will 
no longer be so few and far between with multiple generations within the same 
families managing to co-exist. But we must preserve our ability to distinguish 
between the various attempts to improve the basic quality and longevity of our lives 
from the desire to improve and enhance beyond any sense of what it is to be a person 
in the first place, in other words, creatures who have little or no concept of ending or 
dying since it is a massively diminished possibility for them.
18
 Again, that is not to 
say that a radically mortal life is a superior one, but it is central to any conception of 
personhood and existential significance. One might wonder as to whether the entirely 
natural desire to increase one‟s well-being and life-expectancy could lead to a 
situation where we move beyond humanity to „posthumanity‟? At what point are we 
moving away from life–extension to something which is beyond that human 
aspiration? The posthumanist suggests of course that we are dealing with differences 
of degree or that we are trying to put a road block on a slippery slope. In other words, 
there is ultimately no difference in kind between offering someone the latest medical 
treatments and in fact the desire for immortality. To want not to die prematurely then 
is seen as consistent with wanting to live a life with no temporal horizon. Admittedly, 
this is a difficult place to draw a line in the sand, as it were, since the sands of human 
life-expectancy are constantly shifting. Notwithstanding, part of a person‟s self 
identity is anchored in a sense of their finitude and the fact that they fear their own 
earthly demise does not eliminate or undermine that aspect of their conception of 
themselves as people. While many of us may well want to live past tomorrow or next 
year, it is not ultimately clear that any of us would genuinely want to live forever.  
 
4. SUBJECTIVITY AND PERSONHOOD 
 
So what role does subjectivity play in all of this – in a person‟s conception of 
themselves or their identity? The dominance delusion or, if you like, the illusion of 
autonomy under which we typically labour seems to dupe us into the belief that our 
lives and existence are completely within our control. First of all, given our temporal 
moorings, as discussed above, we can see that that is ultimately not the case. 
Heidegger vitiates this operative assumption in Western philosophy (and no doubt 
this is his great attraction for students of Eastern thought), which was cemented in 
                                                 
18
 “If we learn to control the biochemical processes of human senescence, healthy lifespan could be 
radically prolonged. A person with the age-specific mortality of a 20-year-old would have a life 
expectancy of about a thousand years.” (Bostrom 2007, 16) 
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early modern stone, according to Heidegger, with the Cartesian cogito, where 
everything is seen ultimately as a condition of our own cognition and action. 
Heidegger calls instead for releasement to things (Gelassenheit). He is not so much 
calling for a diminishment of responsibility or a subjugation of one‟s will – rather he 
is criticizing erroneous conceptions of autonomy and selfhood. We cannot ignore our 
historical, cultural and social embeddedness. And in acknowledging these facets of 
our daily lives, we are relinquishing our hold on a phony subjectivity with pretensions 
to absolute self-sovereignty in a world where technology is interpreted as a mere 
means to further our ends. One can, however, learn to live in harmony with our world 
and to find our authentic rhythm within it. We can first manage this by getting clear 
on what it means to be one of us; we begin by acknowledging our true potential as 
temporal creatures, thrown into historical and cultural traditions with an open but 
limited future lived out amongst those who are like us and who are similarly 
determined in advance. We have possibilities available to us, but they are limited by 
our capacities, the environment we are in, the mores and laws we are governed by and 
the fact that we have limited opportunities in a limited amount of time within which 
to get anything done; if we had eternity then the sense of urgency would diminish 
from our various projects. And this in turn, paves the way for a richer sense of what it 
is to be another also.  
Heidegger is often excoriated by commentators for his failure to provide an 
account of the other as part of his account of authenticity. (See Gadamer 2003, 22-3 
and Carman, 2003, 268-71.) It could be argued however that treating others as we 
treat ourselves, from the standpoint of authenticity, would involve seeing the truth of 
our own situation and realizing that others are in the same situation. As Nietzsche 
wrote in a letter to Franz Overbeck: “what is this our life? A boat that swims in the 
sea, and one knows for certain about it that one day it will capsize.” (Nietzsche 1881) 
And we might say then that the ultimate ground for sympathy emerges from a 
realization that we are all in the same boat, so to speak. Or, if we are to be strictly 
Heideggerian, we are all in our own boats, but in the same sea awaiting a similar fate. 
That is, we share structurally identical existential situations, and, thus, we recognize 
the similar situation of others, their existential potential and treat them accordingly, as 
we in turn hope to be treated ourselves in order to constitute a community of 
authentic intersubjectivity. Heidegger‟s adumbrated discussion of the notion of 
“leaping-in for” as opposed to “leaping-ahead for” clearly has something like this in 
mind! In Being and Time, Heidegger describes what he sees as the conditions for the 
possibility of inter-subjectivity. Genuine inter-subjectivity involves not leaping-in for 
but leaping-ahead for another person. (Heidegger 1962, 158, 159) In other words, to 
leap-in for is to close off the potentiality or possibilities for another person by 
assuming control of their future in some immediate sense or other and determining a 
course of action on their behalf. This can happen in all kinds of immediate, quotidian 
ways. The example sometimes used is of someone trying to help a child solve a 
mathematical puzzle or problem. There are two approaches that might be adopted; 
one person might simply ignore the child‟s latent capacity to figure the problem out. 
Another person might try and nurture their fledgling analytical capacity to wrestle 
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with the problem and through a series of progressive steps begin to allow them to 
realize their intellectual potential such that they can solve these problems by 
themselves. This kind of approach would be more in line with leaping-ahead for the 
child, appreciating their potential and allowing it to blossom and develop. The lazier 
approach is to suppress their potential and to leap-in for the child removing their 
authentic future in this sense by simply telling them the answers or showing them 
how to get the right answer without having to fulfill their own critical/analytical 
potential. This would be the inauthentic correlate of authentic inter-subjectivity. 
These varying approaches to other people correspond with either a more general 
leaping-in for another or a leaping-ahead for another, that is, taking someone else as a 
temporal creature with an horizon of possibility and an historical situation in their 
own right or else simply taking them as some kind of creature that is present and 
denying their future in that sense, that is, taking them as simply relevant to some 
objective or other; they are looked at, in that case, in purely functional terms as 
someone that can facilitate some project or other. The condition for the possibility of 
sympathy then would be to acknowledge the temporality of another person, the being-
toward-death of another person, in short, their authentic potentiality for being. 
 
5. TECHNOLOGY AND ENFRAMING 
 
Finally, but no less important for all that, we have to wonder as to our unquestioning 
confidence in technology (especially computer technology) and the way it has shaped 
our understanding of personal identity and the mind. Why is it that our minds and 
identities are almost exclusively described in the techno-speak of, for example, 
information processing? Bostrom himself uses the term technocentric to describe this 
tendency; remarkably, Bostrom uses the word positively and sees it as an 
unproblematic feature of his approach: “Given the technocentric perspective adopted 
here, and in light of our incomplete but substantial knowledge of human history and 
its place in the universe, how might we structure our expectations of things to come?” 
(Bostrom 2007, 9) First, of all, as Bostrom confirms, the perspective of he and his 
colleagues is technocentric and it is a technocentrism which they endorse 
unquestioningly but one which we characterize as problematic in its own right and, in 
fact, as being highly symptomatic of Enframing. Moreover, he invokes, in this 
context, the important role to be played by human history and yet proceeds again with 
the fundamental role occupied by temporality and historicity in terms of human 
history left unaddressed. It is as if history is to mean nothing more than a static 
chronicle, a repository of past events which we can access with a view to acquiring 
useful information instead of seeing its active, dynamic role in shaping our self 
understanding.  
  Perhaps one of the most disconcerting examples of this technical prejudice/ 
technocentrism is to be found in the following description of “uploading” which, to 
my mind, is so self-evidently problematic that it scarcely necessitates further 
comment: 
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Uploading refers to the use of technology to transfer a human mind to a computer. This 
would involve the following steps: First, create a sufficiently detailed scan of a particular 
human brain, perhaps by feeding vitrified brain tissue into an array of powerful 
microscopes for automatic slicing and scanning. Second, from this scanning data, use 
automatic image processing to reconstruct the 3-dimensional neuronal network that 
implemented cognition in the original brain, and combine this map with 
neurocomputational models of the different types of neurons contained in the network. 
Third, emulate the whole computational structure on a powerful supercomputer (or 
cluster). If successful, the procedure would [sic] a qualitative reproduction of the original 
mind, with memory and personality intact, onto a computer where it would now exist as 
software. This mind could either inhabit a robotic body or live in virtual reality. In 
determining the prerequisites for uploading, a tradeoff exists between the power of the 
scanning and simulation technology on the one hand, and the degree of neuroscience 
insight on the other. (Bostrom 2007, 22) 
 
Bostrom defends this kind of technical reductionism throughout his work arguing 
elsewhere, for example, that 
  
Cognitive enhancement is based on the unity between the biological brain and the mind, 
and the unity between different kinds of information processing. Changing biological 
processes enables changes to the mind (and vice versa). Information processing is the 
same whether a brain or a computer does it. It hence lends itself well to the vision of 
converging technology. (Anders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom, 2006, 215) 
 
N. Katherine Hayles responds to such proposals in How We Became Posthuman: 
 
I was reading Hans Moravec‟s Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human 
Intelligence, enjoying the ingenious variety of his robots, when I happened upon the 
passage where he argues that it will soon be possible to download human consciousness 
into a computer. To illustrate, he invents a fantasy scenario in which a robot surgeon 
purees the human brain in a kind of cranial liposuction, reading the information into a 
computer. At the end of the operation, the cranial cavity is empty, and the patient, now 
inhabiting the metallic body of the computer, wakens to find his consciousness exactly 
the same as it was before. [H]ow, I asked myself, was it possible for someone of 
Moravec‟s obvious intelligence to believe that mind could be separated from body? Even 
assuming such a separation was possible, how could anyone think that consciousness in 
an entirely different medium would remain unchanged, as if it had no connection with 
embodiment? Shocked into awareness, I began to notice he was far from alone. (Hayles 
1999, 1) 
 
Neil Badmington, who discusses this passage in “Theorizing Posthumanism”, notes 
the irony here: “the seemingly posthumanist desire to download consciousness into a 
gleaming digital environment is itself downloaded from the distinctly humanist 
matrix of Cartesian dualism.” (Badmington 2003, 11) Of course the concerns of both 
of these critics are well taken and the issue of embodiment in particular is a crucial 
one. However, there are other problems which surface again here that relate to the 
central arguments of this paper. Yet again, there is the problem of the absolute 
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temporal invisibility involved; under this type of technocentric reductionism, no 
allowance is made for the affective and thereby temporal backdrop to human 
consciousness. Furthermore, this kind of technocentrism is a symptom of a corrupted 
type of interpretation, not a neutral or indeed necessary way of understanding 
ourselves and others. Reducing the human mind to the processes of a computer is a 
highly problematic, tendentious and presupposition-laden move. 
  Why have we allowed this technocentric language to hold sway in such a 
monopolizing, eliminativist fashion? The less than obvious problem, then, as a result 
of its universality, pervasiveness and thus familiarity is technology and the role 
technology plays in our lives. The posthumanist may well argue that this is a phoney 
problem. If someone has a problem with their heart, we do everything in our power to 
fix it – what is so different then about enhancing someone‟s brain such that they are 
capable of thinking at the level of an Einstein or Newton? No doubt people from a 
couple of centuries ago would be astounded at the positively Frankensteinian notion 
that today we can replace one person‟s heart, for instance, with someone else‟s. As 
Nick Bostrom points out, someone from a previous historical epoch might well be 
astounded at our current life-expectancy, among other things: “life-expectancy is 
three times longer than in the Pleistocene….In the eyes of a hunter-gatherer, we 
might already appear „posthuman‟.” (Bostrom 2005, 213). Our own resistance then to 
the proposed improvements of the posthumanist, according to Bostrom, are the mere 
prejudices of a certain intellectual provincialism or traditionalism! Aside from the 
unforgivably speculative nature of that kind of criticism through an unwarranted (and 
thereby false) analogy
19
, there is the question as to whether or not there is something 
a little different involved which should give us pause. Part of the difficulty here 
relates to what Heidegger, I believe, would see as the loss of an ability to identify 
differences, to make distinctions, to avoid a monochromatic view of ourselves and the 
world we inhabit. Depending on one‟s interpretive filtering lens, the differences 
between certain events, objects or actions can seem relatively inconsequential. For 
example, if we were to describe the activity of plunging a knife into a mattress with, 
say, the carcass of a pig, and if we are to describe things on a purely molecular level, 
the differences might appear to be simply matters of degree and not kind. However, if 
the pig is alive, we might find ourselves baulking at the idea that the only language 
which is relevant here is the one that describes things on a molecular level. The 
difference involved when one brings suffering into the equation, and perhaps loss of 
life, seems inadequately treated under the rubric of molecular change. We don‟t 
necessarily have to make the further leap to human beings for the difference to appear 
to be one of kind and not degree which demands that we speak with a language which 
does not restrict us to mere changes of degree in this example. The language is 
                                                 
19
 It is merely presumed that the changes being postulated will be accepted as commonplace by future 
generations. There are two problems with this. First, the mere possibility that future generations would 
be unfazed by something that we might find problematic does not in itself mean that there is nothing 
problematic. We might call that a “will/ought” argument. Secondly, there is no guarantee that the 
changes being spoken of would ever be deemed acceptable by a future society. Thus there are two 
unwarranted presumptions buttressing this particular objection/rejoinder. 
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inadequate to the scenario; restricting us rigidly to this language then would be 
wrongheaded – the strategy of an eliminativist20 in this type of situation is erroneous. 
Who is to say that a language which seems counter-intuitive at best when we‟re 
looking for the most comprehensive description of the killing of a live animal with a 
knife compared to the plunging of the same knife into an inanimate object is the only 
acceptable one? It would seem hamstrung by an explanatory poverty of its own. In a 
way, we‟re back to the Platonic problem we invoked at the outset – the wrongheaded 
attempt to use the technical/theoretical model of the exact sciences to make 
intellectual progress in inquiries where the language of that model simply doesn‟t 
work! One approach, one Plato in fact anticipated,
21
 is to insist that these issues then 
cannot be spoken of rather than seeing that different kinds of language are needed for 
different kinds of subjects.
22
 For example, a mathematical account of music may well 
be interesting, enlightening or illuminating; but it hardly exhausts the topic. The 
eliminativist approach suggests that other languages and descriptions are really just 
superfluous or arcane and anything which cannot be expressed in their own 
predetermined, technical terms is really just nonsensical. Indeed, on some issues, I am 
sympathetic to that view and the concomitant critiques of certain examples of folk-
psychology for example. The problems begin with the extension of that eliminativist 
conviction to every issue faced by humans when, in fact, they cannot all reduce to the 
same technical discourse; that fact alone does not make them superfluous or 
nonsensical. After all, how many of us would be willing to concede that someone 
analyzing data in a sound laboratory and recording the frequency of sound waves 
with computer equipment understands Beethoven‟s Ninth Symphony better than the 
composer himself? There is something deeply, intuitively implausible about that idea! 
Beethoven may not have had any proficiency with the technical language of the 
                                                 
20
 I use the term “eliminativist” in the context of this paper to refer to the kind of reductionist attitude 
so prevalent today. I am not thinking solely of the eliminative materialist, but rather of the extension of 
that attitude to many facets of human existence whereby the technical narrative is taken, more or less 
unquestioningly, as the only legitimate one. 
21
 I take this to be, in part, the implication behind Meno‟s articulation of an apparent paradox in the 
middle of the eponymous dialogue. Socrates‟ resolution of the paradox and the more general strategy 
of the dialogue demonstrate the necessity of the nature of inference with respect to mathematical 
problems when it is in fact the question of virtue and where and how one begins to make inferences 
with respect to virtue (which they fail to even define) which is at issue. Meno had initially concluded 
that one cannot speak of virtue at all when all that is shown is that one cannot speak of virtue using the 
theoretical model. 
22
 We are again pointing here to what we have characterized as the Platonic conviction that the 
theoretical model is inappropriate to the “science of human affairs” and thereby call into question the 
eliminativist positivism of, for example, the early Wittgenstein who concludes his early masterpiece 
with the famous asseveration: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” 
(Wittgenstein 1974, 74) What we are trying to suggest, conversely, is that it is not so much that we 
cannot speak about ethical issues, rather, when treating of ethical issues, we should not try to use the 
language of logic, as delineated by Wittgenstein for example. The reductionist language of logical 
exactitude cannot properly account for our ethical lives and so Wittgenstein recommends that we pass 
over ethics in silence. The sign language of Wittgenstein‟s logic is an abstraction from ordinary 
language with a philosophically purgative application. It is not, however, the only language with which 
we can deal with the world. 
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laboratory, but that language really only goes so far when it comes to the range of 
things we wish to discuss regarding a symphony. Granted, the non-technical 
languages we use might well be overly sentimental and susceptible to misuse, but that 
is no argument in favour of using a language which was never appropriate for the 
subjects we are trying to discuss in the first place. The eliminative approach then is 
both insidious and erroneous; it suggests that because we can document countless 
notorious cases where human intransigence or intellectual indigence or attachment to 
folk psychology or bad science impeded intellectual and scientific breakthroughs, that 
any resistance to a new proposal is ipso facto flawed. What is overlooked by this type 
of criticism is the possibility that we might refuse to make something obsolete on the 
basis of a new proposal because it has less explanatory success than the old model; 
being more recent surely does not necessarily betoken more successful or accurate. 
Enframing dupes people into the belief that the technical language of the exact 
sciences must be adopted at the expense of all other languages. Yet nowhere is it 
demonstrated that there is one language appropriate to human experience or life at the 
expense of every other mode of discourse and that it is the language of science or 
mathematics. And, if that much is not conceded, then the high-ground that the 
eliminativist claims to stand on would seem to suddenly sink to the level of one 
among many interpretive molehills on a vast plain of experience. 
  Lest we be misinterpreted here, these are not the concerns of a thoroughgoing 
traditionalist or sentimentalist. We are not advocating a world stripped of the 
scientific description. Much of what we have achieved in science and technology has 
made the world we live in and the lives we lead wonderful. But there are limits to 
what we can deem improvements. Not everything in our lives today seems to be an 
improvement and not because what we can avail of is per se bad, but because we live 
in a world where we seem forced to relinquish so much of our lives to a technological 
existence that we do not have a free relation to. Our relationship to technology is not 
what Heidegger would call a free one, one where we have the capacity to be 
“released” to things and take or leave technology as people who are not constrained to 
revealing the world for ourselves and others through a technological lens. The point is 
not to try and overcome or surmount technology; that was not and never will be 
possible. The point is to not be so enslaved to it as to think that the way it renders the 
world and we who live in it is the only way that we can relate to or understand 
ourselves, others and the world around us. The challenge still remains then for the 
posthumanist to try and see how much of what they advocate is merely the expression 
of a burgeoning and eliminative technological interpretive scheme which feeds 
exponentially on its own momentum and how much can justifiably be classed as 
reflective measures which we might think of using technology for. 
  On the one hand, we seem to intuitively go along with progress in medicine and 
so on, that is, the rate of progress when it comes to life-enhancement is something 
that society seems to be able to keep up with. The question is whether or not the 
progress being touted by the posthumanist is progress of this kind? It is certainly not 
necessarily the case! No one, to my knowledge, ever objected to someone receiving 
cancer treatment using the best methods and procedures available. The question is 
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again as to whether or not there is a difference in kind between such measures and the 
technologies being touted for cognitive and physical enhancement and the answer to 
that question is neither as necessary nor obvious as the posthumanist suggests. All we 
can seem to do is point to the fact that for some reason, the technological stranglehold 
that currently grips our attitudes and understanding seems to be forcing us to contend 
with and accept radical shifts at an ever increasing rate. Moreover, we have to ask 
ourselves whether or not it is becoming increasingly difficult to make distinctions in 
this regard because of our improved understanding or because of a constriction of the 
discursive parameters involved. Many of the working assumptions concerning the 
meaning of the word technology reduce to what Heidegger describes as the 
instrumental, anthropological definition. (Heidegger 1977, 4-5) Technology then is 
simply understood as something that we (human beings) use instrumentally in order 
to further various ends. Heidegger wants to undermine this interpretation completely. 
Indeed, by the time one has wrapped one‟s head around his discussion of technology 
and its “essence” (Enframing), one might be forgiven for supposing that Heidegger 
would reverse things, that is, rather than we/human beings using technology, he might 
argue instead that technology uses us. And preposterous as that may sound prima 
facie, it is not, in the end, a million miles from the truth once one gets at what 
Heidegger really means by being human and what technology and, in particular, the 
essence of technology are manifestations of. Heidegger, as it turns out, has no desire 
to demonize technology, indeed, he famously proclaims in “The Question Concerning 
Technology” that “There is no demonry of technology”. (Heidegger 1977, 28) 
Heidegger is not looking for some reactionary countermovement to technology nor 
does he think we can live our lives stripped of technology; to advocate such a move is 
to misunderstand the role of technology with respect to our lives and how we 
understand our existence and the world around us. 
  Heidegger might well concede that the lines have become blurred between earlier 
and later technologies! But far from this being something that Heidegger was 
enthused by or celebrated, this is something he perceived with some trepidation. 
Given the eliminativist bent of the technological frame of reference, everything we 
describe can be reduced to expressions of more and less sophisticated examples of 
technology. However, this is perhaps not so much because there are no differences, 
but because we have expunged our capacity to make any such distinctions. We no 
longer seem to allow for any narratives/interpretations to mean anything substantive 
in the language of human progress beyond the eliminativist language of technological 
Enframing where everything is reduced to resource and standing-reserve – to be 
manipulated, broken down, and either made obsolete, maintained or indeed enhanced! 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
In looking at our vague, quotidian sense of personhood, we managed to identify the 
notion of affectivity as fundamental. Any legitimate conception of personhood entails 
a rich emotional life, one which we can empathize with and share. Our emotional life, 
our affective understanding, in short, our ability to experience, according to 
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Heidegger, is run through with a temporal character. That is, the manner in which any 
kind of experience can occur for us must be temporally filtered. Our radical finitude 
is constitutive, even at the subliminal level, of the way we experience, interpret and 
respond to the world we find ourselves thrown into. The technical approach to 
personhood tends to take an anatomical view of the person/human being and thus 
misses the narrative glue which holds the person together, namely, our historicity – 
our temporal limits. The tendency is to look at the various components outside of any 
such context and to simply apply the criteria of optimum functioning. This failure to 
pay any attention to the temporal glue that holds our narrative, affective identities 
together is a critical one for the posthumanist position. Moreover, as part of that 
reductionist view of the human being, the posthumanist unquestioningly advocates 
the ideal of life extension to the nth degree, that is, their ultimate aspiration involves 
the vanquishing of our temporality altogether – the ultimate fantasy of corporeal and 
egocentric immortality. However, to achieve as much would essentially render our 
current sense of being human, our affectivity, our values, in short, the way we 
interpret and experience the world, obsolete. In other words, the ultimate aspirations 
and goals of posthumanism would result in the complete debasement and erasure of 
any current sense of humanity/personhood. 
  Much of what we have been trying to argue here might be dismissed as a kind of 
intellectual provincialism, but that is not at all the aim of this inquiry. We have no 
normative agenda, nor are we trying to preserve an ideal of human existence which 
stands as the backdrop to some kind of moral ideology. Rather, what we have been 
trying to suggest is that whatever way one wants to look at things, the question as to 
the temporal backdrop to our personhood is something that needs to be addressed. 
And before we can begin to consider the details of the posthumanist‟s position and 
the kinds of enhancements of cognitive and physical capacities that they discuss, we 
have to ask where our sense of personhood, value, or identity will come from in an 
age where we have gone beyond humans to posthumans. We must push the 
posthumanist for some further clarification as to where their criteria for evaluating 
enhancement come from.
23
 What conception of humanity or posthumanity, with 
overused but under-defined attendant phrases like “human dignity” and “human 
nature”, do they in fact have? In other words, we must ask how much of their own 
vision and programme for improvement is a symptom of the holding sway of 
Enframing. How much of what they currently recommend is actually an expression of 
their own unquestioned acceptance of an eliminative technical interpretive scheme 
which currently holds sway at the expense of any other form of interpretation or 
understanding vis a vis human beings? 
  It is not so much that these concerns demonstrate the moral turpitude of 
posthumanism. The concern of this paper is more epistemological than normative. 
                                                 
23
 Needless to say, reductionist, pseudo-scientific iterations like the following definition of 
enhancement do little substantive work, instead they reflect the reductionist interpretive prejudices of 
the author: “Enhancement: An intervention that improves the functioning of some subsystem of an 
organism beyond its reference state; or that creates an entirely new functioning or subsystem that the 
organism previously lacked.” (Bostrom 2008, 7)  
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Indeed, the posthumanist might well riposte that the fact that our current sense of 
personhood has a temporal character is no argument for proposing that it ought to be 
this way. In the same way that we criticized an implicit version of a will/ought fallacy 
in the posthumanist defence of various measures they call for, we can hardly defend a 
status quo stance on the basis of an is/ought argument. The fact that our values and 
our sense of identity are currently conditioned by our temporal limits, does not mean 
that they must always be so conditioned. But with this, we are on the threshold of 
some very difficult questions; questions which posthumanists have thus far failed to 
identify, never mind answer. And, this is where the continental and analytic 
commentators need to pool their resources in the interests of moving forward. The 
analyst cannot resist the deconstructionist‟s critique without making a number of 
presuppositions which are not philosophically viable, not least, the supposition that it 
is unproblematic to proceed with an account as to what is preferable in terms of being 
a person, whether human or posthuman, without ever actually offering even a 
minimally defensible account of personhood which, for the time being, still requires 
an acknowledgement of the temporal constitution of identity/personhood. 
Nevertheless, we must still be willing to offer something substantive following the 
deconstructive critique; these issues, as Bostrom has convincingly argued, do and will 
continue to affect us all and we must develop the philosophical resources to begin to 
deal with them adequately. This may well be where some direction or guidance could 
be found in traditions outside of our own somewhat self-absorbed Western, 
technocentric tradition; and, while the positive possibilities seem more than 
encouraging, they also belong to a project to which we could pay only the most paltry 
lip service here and must therefore be left to future endeavours. 
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it suggest future-directed activism. By way of reconstructing its descriptive, explanatory and 
emancipatory dimensions, it is shown that Daoism constitutes an alternative form of critical 
theory. In contrast to future-directed purposive action or blind rule-following, Daoism's key 
normative concept of "wu-wei" emphasizes effortless non-calculative responsiveness in the 
present. Drawing on recent insights in the philosophy of action, a reconstruction of wu-wei 
allows to conceive of a promising form of emancipatory agency.       
 
Keywords: Daoism, critical theory, wu-wei, instrumental action, effortlessness, temporality 
of action 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The legend of the origin of the proto-Daoist text Dao-De-Jing (道德經) dates back to 
the historian Sima Qian (145-85 BC). It is likely to be more fiction than fact.
1
 
However, even though the legend remains historically unverifiable, it is nevertheless 
important to recount since it has given rise to a philosophically rich effective history. 
Daoist philosophy is said to rest on an act of exchange. The sage Lao Zi was 
determined to leave the middle kingdom after a long and, despite dissatisfaction with 
the norms of his day, saturated life. He approached the Western border of the 
kingdom of Zhou where he encountered Yin Xi, who was the ancient version of a 
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customs and border control officer. Yin Xi asked Lao Zi to pay his dues. Since the 
sage was not an affluent man and did not possess anything dispensable, he was 
politely asked to pay for his passage by writing down what he had discovered during 
his philosophical wayfaring. After giving in to the request, Lao Zi left the kingdom to 
move West where he died much later at the magnificent age of 160. According to this 
legend, it is thus only by accident, or, to be more precise, through a generous act of 
exchanging the right of passage for the codification of Daoist philosophy, that the 
5000 words divided into the 81 chapters we know under the title of Dao-De-Jing have 
been passed down to us. 
  During his exile from Nazi Germany, the Marxist poet Bertholt Brecht carried a 
painting depicting the scene of Lao Zi riding a water buffalo towards the border with 
him. Brecht's captivating poem from 1938 about the ―Legend of the Origin of the 
Book Dao-De-Jing on Lao Zi's Road into Exile‖ was circulated widely among those 
persecuted by totalitarian regimes. The poem sparked a sense of hope in the midst of 
historical catastrophe. Did Brecht's adaptation of the legend simply present an 
unwarranted and sufficiently exotic consolation for the victims of an atrocious history 
who, if they were lucky, could escape, or does it indeed contain a philosophically 
significant content, an explosive message in a bottle? When the boy accompanying 
Lao Zi was asked by the pragmatic gate keeper in Brecht's poem what the sage had 
discovered, the boy responds: ―he learnt that soft water, by way of movement over the 
years, will grind strong rocks away. In other words: that hardness succumbs.‖2 
Drawing on the at the time common trope of the power of water to overcome the 
seemingly greatest of obstacles,
3
 what Brecht's border-crosser Lao Zi had discovered 
was an understanding of what could be called ―liquid resistance.‖ In contrast to firm 
materials, formless water does not overcome obstacles by way of direct confrontation, 
but through seemingly unintended, effortless and unpredictable processes of 
emulation and changing course whenever necessary. Rather than provoking resistance 
through acts of direct engagement, water is efficacious in overcoming obstacles by 
way of yielding and acquiescing to them. It purifies itself by standing still and finds 
its way by floating to the lowest point. The captivating poem by Brecht and its 
equally rich effective history poses the vexing question: what is the critical potential 
of Daoist philosophy that motivated Brecht and other social critics identifying with 
the fate of the most abject, degraded and precarious forms of existence to be swayed 
                                                 
2
 Bertolt Brecht (1981, 660-663). The cited quotation from stanza 5 reads in the original: „Daß das 
weiche Wasser in Bewegung/ Mit der Zeit den mächtigen Stein besiegt. / Du verstehst, das Harte 
unterliegt.― See also Heinrich Detering (2008). 
3
 The water imagery is developed in chapters 4, 7, 43 and, most extensively, in chapter 78 of the Dao-
De-Jing: ―In all the world, nothing is more supple or weak than water/ Yet nothing can surpass it for 
attacking what is still and strong./ And so nothing can take its place./ That the weak overcomes the 
strong and the supple overcomes the hard/ These are things everyone in the world knows but none can 
practice.‖ (chapter 78, 81). Sarah Allan (1997) persuasively traces the way in which water serves as a 
root metaphor to illustrate the principles governing human conduct in classical, pre-Qin Chinese 
philosophical traditions.  
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by its message, a message that seems radically different from the typical Marxist call 
to arms in the service of historical struggle for the sake of the worst-off?  
  Brecht's adaptation of Daoism seems all the more perplexing given the conception 
of Chinese philosophy in the West. One common critique leveled against Chinese 
philosophical traditions goes something like this. Rather than providing another 
alternative foundation for Enlightenment reason, Confucianism and Daoism are 
essentially incompatible with individual autonomy and equality, the pillars of the 
Enlightenment project. The alleged deficit is then attributed to a difference in 
philosophical outlook. The age of critique, announced in a tone of philosophical 
audacity from the Neo-Copernican Kant, claims philosophical singularity and 
superiority with regard to his East Asian contenders. While Western philosophical 
traditions in the Enlightenment tradition call into question established webs of 
authority, the emphasis on cosmic harmony in Confucianism and Daoism is said to 
rest on an acceptance of unquestioned relationships of power. In other words, 
harmony is emphasized at the expense of a capacity for individual resistance and 
critique. If autonomy and equality are the pillars of enlightenment reason, the 
capacity to resist is its muscle. If Daoism just gives in to established authorities, it 
does not possess the capacity of resistance, thus making it unsuitable for 
emancipation emphasized in the wake of the Enlightenment.  
  Following this line of critique, two specific strains of objections against Daoism's 
emancipatory potential and enlightenment deficit thus need to be addressed up front 
before discussing in what sense Daoism can be interpreted as a critical theory. One 
line of critique is addressed at Daoism's primitivist naturalism while the other set of 
objections focuses on the proposed technique of emulation. The first group of critics 
conceives of Daoism as a reactionary movement propagating a return to nature. Such 
movements claim that the present is fallen when compared to an allegedly earlier, 
blissful state in need of being restored once again. The emulation of a constantly 
changing yet static environment envisioned by Daoists is criticized as a form of 
imitation of, or a call for a return to, a primary state of nature. The natural world is 
being romanticized, critics contend, as idyllic and ethically superior. This line of 
critique, clearly mirroring Christian conceptions of a myth of the primal fall as one 
finds them in Western romanticism, hardly does justice to the gist of the normative 
ideals we find in the oldest Daoist texts. Rather than advocating a return to a 
simplicity that allegedly existed in some prior historical period, Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi 
draw on what they describe as "natural" processes in order to delineate structures of 
present flourishing in the midst of "historical" crises. Nature is not what happened 
prior to the fall from paradise to civilization, but the spontaneity which is ever again 
threatened to be covered up by webs of social domination and misguided authority.  
  That the pervasive reference to nature in Daoist texts is not the kind of naturalism 
the first group of critics take it to be becomes clear if we turn to the first readers of 
the classical Daoists who stressed that emulation is not to be misunderstood as 
imitation. Guo Xiang already emphasized in his commentary on the Zhuang-Zi (莊子) 
that blind imitation of an allegedly natural condition is useless, fruitless and harmful. 
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Imitation is useless because the world is in constant flux and different times require 
different responses. Imitation is also fruitless since the very act of imitation 
presupposes a conscious effort, which stands in the way of achieving the naturalness 
that is being attributed to what is being imitated. And, finally, imitation is said to be 
harmful in that it manifests a constant striving to overcome one's limits. This 
overcoming rather than acknowledging stands in the way of optimal, we could also 
say, non-reified practices of self- other- and world-relationships.
4
 The term ‗zi-ran‘ 
(自然), which is translated as ‗natural‘, offers itself as a denominator for such 
processes of spontaneous flourishing. Just as optimal forms of action seem to be 
performed as if by themselves and without an ulterior end, nature also is not equipped 
with a fixed trajectory while revealing a sense of flourishing and fittingness. The 
reference to naturalness serves as a critique against artificial forms of ―second nature‖ 
in the form of reified conceptions of morality and straining activism.  
  In the case of an occasional reference to an allegedly better past, for example to 
the utopian village in chapter 80 of the Dao-De-Jing, what is depicted is not a 
historical past of perfected human beings who live in harmony with nature. Rather, 
the images serve as mythic or utopian evocations of a mode of being and power-
execution which is significantly different and more sophisticated than that found in 
societies which use up all resources in acts of instrumental activism.
5
 In the case of 
the utopian village, what is depicted is not a primitive community before the fall. The 
city possesses tools such as ships and carts, armor and weapons, but they ―have no 
reason to deploy them.‖6 This city consists a group of people, which is 
technologically highly advanced while preserving the freedom to not use the 
technology at its disposal, to live a decelerated life in the present while leaving the 
technological choices at their disposal unused whenever their application is not 
absolutely necessary. They live in relatively small communities in order not to be 
governed by a distant government they do not have an obvious connection to. The 
imagination is used here as a laboratory to provide impulses in order to enrich 
conceptions of chosen, communal and sophisticated passivity in the present rather 
than primitive innocence or unreflective activism directed at the future.  
  Apart from the charge of primitive naturalism, a second, perhaps more forceful 
strain of objections against Daoism's critical potential concerns what is seen as the 
opportunistic strategy or set of techniques arising out of the ethics of emulation. 
While the first group of critics object to Daoism's alleged primitivism, the second 
group object to the proposed forms of emulation. This second strain of objections 
contends that Daoism essentially reconciles actors to the pathological structures of 
their age rather than empowering them to understand, oppose and, ultimately, 
transform or abolish these structures. This critique reflects a long tradition of 
                                                 
4
 Fung Yu-Lan (1976, 226-227). 
5
 Viktor Kalinke (1999, 90) writes, ―it is apparent that the emphasis of what has been does not aim at 
an objective historiography, but at the decelleration (Verzögerung) of action. A reflection and 
comparison with what is comparable is being called for. It has a psychological function, which is 
expressed in the German word 'nachdenken' (re-membering or after-thought)‖.  
6
 Dao-De-Jing, trans. Ivanhoe (chapter 81). 
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accusing Daoism of promoting a problematic form of quietism. Rather than resisting 
problematic processes of change, they are said to accept these phenomena as 
unchangeable. The best one can do, Daoists seem to suggest, is to use what is 
problematic but here to stay to one's advantage. The enfent terrible of contemporary 
philosophy Slavoi Zizek puts it as follows:  
 
The recourse to Taoism or Buddhism offers a way out of this predicament which 
definitely work better than the desperate escape into old traditions: instead of trying to 
cope with the accelerating rhythm of the technological progress and social changes, one 
should rather renounce the very endeavor to retain control over what goes on, rejecting it 
as the expression of the modern logic of domination - one should, instead, ―let oneself 
go,‖ drift along, while retaining an inner distance and indifference towards the mad dance 
of the accelerated process, a distance based on the insight that all this social and 
technological upheaval is ultimately just a non-substantial proliferation of semblances 
which do not really concern the innermost kernel of our being... One is almost tempted to 
resuscitate here the old infamous Marxist cliché of religion as the ―opium of the people,‖ 
as the imaginary supplement of the terrestrial misery: the ―Western Buddhist‖ meditative 
stance is arguably the most efficient way, for us, to fully participate in the capitalist 
dynamics, while retaining the appearance of mental sanity. If Max Weber were to live 
today, he would definitely write a second, supplementary, volume to his Protestant Ethic, 
entitled The Taoist Ethic and the Spirit of the Global Capitalism.
7
 
 
While Zizek agrees that Daoism is not a form of primitivist romanticism, he argues 
that contemporary appropriations of Eastern thought, in particular Daoism, are a 
psychic symptom of neoliberal capitalism rather than promising conceptual and 
practical tools to understand and transform it. Rather than coming to terms with the 
accelerating logic of late modern societies, Daoist patterns of action, on Zizek's 
account, at best help to wander at ease within these pathological structures. They keep 
up the illusion of equanimous mental sanity in the midst of catastrophic madness.  
  Just as the charge against Daoism‘s alleged primitivism, Zizek's interpretation 
seems mistaken to me. It might be a legitimate response to certain ―Eurodaoist‖8 
forms of lifestyle philosophies and new age wisdom literature propagating that a 
spiritual change will automatically lead to a transformation of the environing system 
parameters. What the objection fails to acknowledge and do justice to, though, is the 
emancipatory impulse behind Daoism. Rather than opposing one's changing 
environment with outdated images of bliss, by emulating this environment in 
constantly readjusting ways like a river adjusts its course, actors reclaim naturalness 
in their action and become empowered. Such an empowerment does not proceed by 
mastering the world through one's purposive efforts, but emancipates itself by 
                                                 
7
 Slavoi Zizek (2001). Zizek missed the fact that Max Weber (1989) did indeed write a second less 
known sequel to the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism in which he explicitly addresses 
Confucianism and the heterodox dimensions of Daoism while arguing for their responsibility for the 
precarious condition of China around the turn to the 20
th
 century.  
8
 Peter Sloterdijk (1989). 
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responding to the environment in the form of adjusting to dynamic processes in 
refined and often subversive ways.   
  Perhaps the most prominent and promising critical concept of Daoism is the 
guiding conceptual metaphor of wu-wei (無爲). It captures what this liquid resistance 
means in terms of concrete actions. Wu-wei is commonly translated as ―non-doing‖ or 
―non-action‖. Following Liu Xiaogan, we can say that ―naturalness is the core value 
of the thought of Lao Zi, while wu-wei is the principle or method for realizing this 
value in action.‖9 This essential action-theoretical concept fills an important lacuna in 
contemporary critical theory. A charitable reconstruction could be immensely 
productive in contemporary debates in critical theory and the philosophy of action 
developed in the contemporary analytic and continental traditions.
10
 Such a 
reconstruction would free philosophical Daoism from its alleged enlightenment 
deficit.  
  Even a cursory look at the writings of the classical Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi 
suffices to reveal their emancipatory potential. Due to their hermeneutic openness, 
Daoist sources have been interpreted at different times as primitivism, religious 
mysticism, military strategy, advice to emperors, manuals for religious initiation and 
self-cultivation, normative and epistemic relativism, precursors of postmodernism, 
anarchism, linguistic skepticism or simply as a collection of incoherent poetic sayings 
which defy the systematizing and rigorous logic common to mainstream 
contemporary philosophy.
11
 In what follows I would like to add one more reading and 
suggest that the spirit of Daoism is captured best when it is understood as a form of 
critical theory. Daoists propose a different enlightenment and a different critical 
theory, thereby presenting us with what Bert Brecht called a device of bringing forth 
a defamiliarization and estrangement (Verfremdungseffekt). This interpretative 
hypothesis can serve as a prolegomena to a future research project. To make such a 
project not only plausible but also fruitful, I would like to show that Daoism, 
understood as a distinctly other form of critical theory, is capable of providing 
impulses that could be taken up in addressing one of the most pressing issues facing 
critical theorists today.  
   Daoism, I argue, can be helpful in conceiving of a form of non-instrumental 
action and reawaken a sense of potentiality, which helps to uncover a blind spot at the 
basis of conceptions of time and action as we find it in contemporary critical 
philosophy. A charitable reinterpretation of the Daoist concept of wu-wei allows us to 
                                                 
9
 Xiaogan Liu (1999, 211).  
10
 Edward Slingerland (2006) interprets the conception of wu-wei understood as effortless action. It 
might be argued that certain theories of action in the European canon point into similar directions. 
Aristotle's conception of praxis, for example, and its reception by Hannah Arendt and others come to 
mind. I will show at a different occasion that these conceptions retain the temporal framework 
governing purposive actions, motivating a more radical break such as the one provided by an updated 
account of Daoist effortless action.  
11
 For a detailed account of the history of Daoism see Livia Kohn (2000), as well as Russell Kirkland 
(2004). For a systematic introduction see Hans-Georg Möller (2001). 
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conceive of a form of practical reason and action, which embodies a promising 
alternative to instrumental rationality. A reorientation of critique resulting from a 
constructive engagement with Daoism would have to arise out of an acknowledgment 
that one of the underlying ideologies of modernity consists precisely in a problematic 
preoccupation with either the past or the future at the expense of acknowledging 
perfecting forms of effortless action as they reveal themselves in the present. To make 
this claim intelligible it is necessary to call to mind the basic structure of critical 
theory.  
 
2. THE THREEFOLD STRUCTURE OF CRITICAL THEORY 
 
First, it is necessary to outline what is meant by ―critical theory‖ before pursuing the 
question whether, and in what sense, Daoism can legitimately be understood as 
another critical theory. Critical theory usually combines diagnostic, explanatory and 
emancipatory dimensions. In analyzing societies in times of crises and destitution, 
deeply seated pathologies are uncovered. These range from exploitation of 
underprivileged strata of the population and consumerism to the environmental and 
social costs of neoliberal market economies. Not only are these pathologies revealed, 
but their root causes and social functions are also being traced and, if possible, means 
of practically overcoming them are pointed out.  
  Pathologies are social and psychological deformations on a structural level 
manifesting themselves in social institutions, individual patterns of beliefs, 
motivations and practices. The pathologies which critical theory has been diagnosing 
can be summarized, following Marx, Lukacs and Weber, as a combination of 
reification, disenchantment and acceleration. In the process of increasingly 
understanding intersubjective-, self- and world-relationships primarily from the 
perspective of exchanging equivalent commodities on a market governed 
increasingly, and sometimes exclusively, by a competition for these commodities, 
individuals become systematically estranged from the objects they produce, the 
process of production, themselves, and from the community of fellow human 
beings.
12
 
   The pathology of reification (Verdinglichung) arising from the exchange principle 
governing ever more dimensions of society has been analyzed, drawing on the early 
Marx and Lukacs, from a variety of perspectives.
13
 Originally reification referred to 
the process of making singular human beings and experiences similar and 
exchangeable by abstracting from their unique qualities. While the concept seemed 
outdated for a long time due to its implicit assumption of a human essence from 
which one could become estranged, it made an astonishing comeback. Whether it is a 
critique of the reification/distortion of communication,
14
 the reification of 
relationships of intersubjective recognition,
15
 the reification of gender roles
16
 or the 
                                                 
12
 Karl Marx (1973, 108-111). 
13
 See for example Axel Honneth, (2005). 
14
 Jürgen Habermas (1984).   
15
 Axel Honneth (1996).  
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reification of conceptions of the self,
17
 what is being criticized are relationships 
primarily controlled by a fixed logic of instrumental reason and strategic bargaining 
processes rather than mutual understanding, recognition, care for the self, love and 
other preconditions of leading a good life within the constraints of justice.  
  Apart from the attempts to shed light on reification as a major form of pathology 
in modern societies, it is a significant success of recent work in critical social theory 
to emphasize that not all pathologies of modernity can be reduced to intersubjective 
pathologies of communication and reification.
18
 People in late modern societies do 
not just suffer from being used rather than understood or being invisible rather than 
recognized. They also suffer from what Max Weber called ‗disenchantment‘ 
(Entzauberung). In the process of increased rationalization, traditional sources of 
meaning that were sedimented in inherited religious traditions, social institutions and 
customs have lost their power in orienting lives.  
  Finally, the process that reification and the vanishing of resources of meaning 
have been engaged in is one of an increasing acceleration (Beschleunigung) in which, 
as Marx puts it, ―everything that is solid melts into the air‖. We witness a 
progressively increasing speed not only of technological innovation, but of social 
change since the late medieval period. While there was an intergenerational speed of 
change in the early modern period, and a generational speed of change during 
classical and high modernity, late modernity is characterized by an intragenerational 
speed of change in which the basic parameters of coordinating one‘s life change 
within a lifetime. In this latest stage of acceleration, the only thing that is certain is 
that what was taken to be certain today might not be certain tomorrow.
19
 This 
acceleration is both subjectively experienced and corresponds to objective modes of 
accelerated life ranging from processing information, the transportation of goods and 
people, voting behavior to the change of significant others and professions. Increased 
change of environments and values undermines traditional forms of identity 
formation since actors are forced to constantly reassess and readjust their forms of 
life, practices and sets of convictions. 
   All three pathologies constitute forms of social injury. While the psychological 
impact of reification leads to systematic forms of forced inclusion or exclusion, of 
being restricted to or being left out of fixed identities, and the process of 
disenchantment corresponds to a sense of existential absurdity in a world devoid of 
binding resources of meaning, the pressures of increasing acceleration are 
experienced in terms of existential exhaustion and anxiety. As a consequence, there is 
an increased sense of superfluousness and being antiquated, a fear to be left behind in, 
or fall outside of the rushing hamster's wheel of late modern societies.    
  However distinct these pathologies might appear, it is crucial to notice that there 
is a close linkage between these three briefly outlined pathological tendencies of 
modern societies. Not only are reification, disenchantment and acceleration 
                                                                                                                                           
16
 Judith Butler (1999).  
17
 Michel Foucault (1977). 
18
 See J.M. Bernstein (2001); Nikolas Kompridis (2006). 
19
 Hartmut Rosa, (2005, chapter 5). 
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historically connected, they also imply each other on a conceptual level. Reification 
consists in seeing the world primarily from the vantage point of being a means or a 
toolbox from which means can be utilized in order to bring about a desired end. In 
this objectifying process, the end justifies the variable means and is the only factor 
taken to be intrinsically valuable. This end, then, is understood as not presently 
realized but as a future possibility the reality of which depends on the implementation 
of one's plan of action. Bernard Williams, the eminent British moral philosopher, 
stresses this point by arguing that without projecting an aim into the future, life would 
become meaningless. He argues for ―the idea of a man's ground projects providing 
the motive force which propels him into the future, and gives him a reason for 
living.‖20 If it were the case that our very existence would be safeguarded only as 
long as we intentionally pursue future-directed goals and projects in increasingly 
rationalized ways, it would mean that actors would be doomed to be increasingly 
alienated from a present they could at best regard as offering instrumentally useful, 
but intrinsically insignificant means for a supposedly meaningful future. Seen from 
the temporal horizon of the actor engaged in instrumental reasoning and action, the 
present events, actions, objects and subjects lack any intrinsic value. They are 
regarded as merely ―useful for‖ certain projects rather than significant in virtue of 
what they are. The moment a project is realized, the satisfaction vanishes since it is 
not futural anymore. By presupposing such a restricted conception of projective 
action as the reason for living, the present environment an actor navigates in is 
transformed into pure immanence in which prediction becomes possible to the point 
of resembling an analytic judgment: assuming that we know what we want, and if we 
can do what we want while nobody keeps us from doing it, what we want will 
become realized. Novelty is being reduced to the discovery of new implications of 
what has already been familiar. Effort is generated once we see the end of our action 
as external to our spontaneously generated attachments. It grows out of the attempt to 
realize the stipulated end in ever more innovative, efficient and predictable ways in 
which spontaneity is, at best, forced towards a goal. The goal at which effort is 
directed often drops out of focus during the acceleration process or it loses its appeal. 
It seems external to the actor who has been trapped in a means-ends apparatus. This 
rationalization process increasingly becomes independent from the specificity of ends 
pursued and impossible to get out of. With every rationalized act the actor moves 
deeper into the quicksand of a world of suppressed spontaneity.  
  The consequence of this seemingly autonomous rationalization process famously 
described by Weber as an ―iron cage‖ is that the present is being downgraded as 
insignificant on its own terms when compared to the future gains one promises 
oneself as the payoff of one's actions. Processes of innovation become the norm and 
speed up because actors hope to do and achieve ever more goals in increasingly 
                                                 
20
 Bernard Williams (1982, 13). Harry Frankfurt objects to Williams on this point by arguing that ―our 
interest in living does not commonly depend upon our having projects that we desire to pursue. It's the 
other way around: we are interested in having worthwhile projects because we do intend to go on 
living, and we would prefer not to be bored.‖ Taking Ourselves Seriously & Getting it Right (2006, 36-
37).   
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shorter segments of emptied time. Actors rush to a future, which can in principle 
never be actualized. Paul Virillio fittingly describes this blind acceleration process of 
chasing structurally elusive future goals in increasingly higher speeds of innovation 
adequately as a ―rushing standstill‖. From within the ―iron cage‖ of modernity true 
innovation, which would have to be different from mere acceleration or enhancement 
and would require deliberating about alternative present ends, seems increasingly 
impossible.
21
 The new is transfigured into the only variable that is to be expected. 
Instrumental action as the reified forgetfulness of the meaning resources of the 
present for the sake of the projected future thus seems without alternative. The 
consequence is what Hermann Lübbe refers to as a ‗Gegenwartsschrumpfung‘, a 
continuing shrinking of the present under the complimentary pressures of the 
tendencies of melancholic musealization of irretrievably lost pasts and forced 
innovation to run after structurally elusive futures.
22
 
  The dilemma with which critical theorists see themselves confronted is that 
whatever emancipatory tendencies – be they introduced as forms of resistance, mutual 
understanding, recognition etc. – are being proposed as means for a future end, 
instrumental action is reenacted under a normative guise and the domination of the 
future over the rest of time is thus further sedimented. As soon as instrumental actors 
propose or just point to emancipatory forms of action, they replicate and reenact the 
same temporal logic that it originally diagnosed as the problem of modernity, i.e., the 
belief that the future can be mastered through acts of projective planning. The 
problem of this projective planning mentality is not that things often turn out 
differently than planned, but that the actor sidesteps and thereby undermines the 
significance of the present and sees it simply as something to be used for future ends. 
In other words, by downgrading the present including its modes of action to being 
"for the sake of the future," critical theory denigrates the present to the status of a pre-
future, a state of emptiness that is used as a resource rather than lived in.    
  A theory exposing and explaining social pathologies is keen on pointing to the 
inescapable mechanisms preventing the emancipatory use of reason through action. 
Such an exclusive focus on the diagnosis and emergence of pathologies coincides 
with developing an ethics of melancholy that emphasizes the inescapable specter of 
instrumental reason. Looking back in a melancholy state of mind over the long 
history of failed revolutions, it only sees what has been irretrievably lost in the wake 
of histories of catastrophes.
23
 The present is now seen as an appendix to a past larger 
than life, an after-past. By replacing the search for an alternative mode of present 
potentiality with a focus on the traumatic experiences of history, it forecloses the 
possibility of emancipatory action in the present and thereby reverses the temporal 
logic of modernity. By replacing the infatuation of the projected future over the 
present, a new domination – that of the past over the present – is being introduced and 
sedimented. While the former domination – that of the future over the present - 
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 Paul Virillio (1999). 
22
 Hermann Lübbe (1994).  
23
 Gillian Rose (1979); Gregg M. Horowitz (2001). 
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corresponded to forms of blind activism, the latter – that of the past over the present - 
leads to a state of passivity, an inhibition, which replaces the engagement with the 
present for the contemplation of mnemonic art. The consequence is not a liberation of 
the past (which is in principle impossible) or a liberation of the present, but an 
extension of the temporal pressure put on the present. While the classical modernists 
only had to justify themselves with respect to the future, late modernists also have to 
justify themselves with respect to the past.  
  This detour was intended to show that the instrumental actor finds himself in a 
dilemma that seems impossible to get out off. The shrinking of the present arising out 
of instrumental action constitutes a theoretical as well as practical impasse. A 
transcultural engagement with Daoism understood as another critical theory could 
turn out to be fruitful given that it emerged within a cultural context in which 
instrumental action has not been the only or even primary form of action. First, 
however, it needs to be asked whether it is at all legitimate to interpret Daoism as 
another critical theory. 
 
3. DAOISM AS ANOTHER CRITICAL THEORY 
 
In the second part of the paper I will first show that Daoism can be understood as a 
critical theory and then discuss whether it offers an insight that could overcome the 
uneasy relationship between critical theory and emancipatory action with a focus on 
the present. The goal is to show that the proto-Daoists Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, 
commonly referred to as "Lao-Zhuang", provide a promising path which points to an 
alternative approach of addressing the vexing problem of instrumental action 
expressing itself in the pathologies of reification, disenchantment and acceleration. At 
the risk of engaging in anachronistic hermeneutics by applying texts from a different 
tradition which date back two and a half-millennia, the benefits of tapping rich 
conceptual sources providing a new insight into entrenched philosophical 
preconceptions seem overwhelming. Compared to European traditions, Daoism's long 
history of addressing phenomena of reification and change in theoretical, as well as 
practical ways, provides an immense richness not only for a reorientation of critical 
theory, but also in terms of envisioning emancipatory practices. The insight into the 
fluidity of social dynamics and the fluid subjectivity of actors anticipates many of the 
developments of late modern societies. At the same time Daoism offers us correctives 
to these developments. The early Daoist acknowledgment of the value of idling and 
uselessness, for example, allows us to level a critique of the pathologies of reification, 
disenchantment and acceleration deriving from a reduction of action to instrumental 
action. A critical theory in the spirit of Daoism would not simply disclose 
pathologies. It would also offer constructive resources which allow us to critically 
address and, as far as possible, overcome these pathologies without providing yet 
another reifying project that sells out on the potentiality of the present for the sake of 
the future.  
  Before focusing on how Daoism could help to address the connection between 
suffering from reification, disenchantment and acceleration, let us first step back and 
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consider the all but self-evident proposal to conceive of Daoism as a form of critical 
theory. I will only briefly mention the diagnostic and explanatory dimensions for the 
reasons that they are the weakest and least developed parts in Daoist thinking, while 
the emancipatory dimension offers a way to address the question concerning the 
difficulty arising from the attempt to overcome instrumental rationality without 
replicating its underlying temporal logic.  
  First, Daoism is critical in the most obvious and widely acknowledged sense in 
that it presents a response to the destitution of China during the late Zhou dynasty in 
which war and social disintegration threatened the stability of society.
24
 Apart from 
this historical reason, exposing certain parallels with today's crises-ridden global 
order, both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi are critical of the philosophical attempts to address 
this destitution, especially the attempt of Confucius and his successor, Mencius. 
Whereas Confucius and his followers propagated the cultivation of the virtuous 
human being with the goal of integrating him or her into a hierarchically ordered 
social organism through the subjection to principles of love and filial piety, the 
Daoists pursued a conscious retreat from commonly accepted social norms and 
rejected the starting point of normative theory understood as outlining universal, 
context-independent principles of social obligation and cultivation more generally: 
―Filial piety, brotherliness, benevolence, righteousness, loyalty, trust, honor, 
integrity-for all of these you must drive yourself and make a slave of Virtue.‖25 While 
the Confucians aim at cultivating the individual to fulfill the duties springing from his 
or her fixed position in the web of social relationships, the Daoists propagate an 
unlearning process with the indirect goal of interrupting webs of social integration, 
including the desire for social recognition, for the sake of cultivating spontaneity. The 
individual is strengthened in his or her capacity to resist with regard to commonly 
accepted values of the community. However, the liquid, readjusting self propagated 
by Daoism is not an autonomous, deliberative firm subject commonly known in the 
Western philosophical traditions. Rather, it is a flexible or liquid self, which refuses 
to adhere to context-independent moral principles while responding to its 
environment in emancipatory ways.
26
 
  By focusing on outlining context-independent moral obligations, Confucian 
benevolence only addresses the pathologies of the age at the surface level, while 
leaving the deeper causes of alienation from the dao, the patterns of spontaneous 
flourishing, untouched: ―When the great Way is abandoned, there are benevolence 
and righteousness. When wisdom and intelligence come forth, there is great 
hypocrisy. When the six familial relationships are out of balance, there are kind 
parents and filial children. When the state is in turmoil and chaos, there are loyal 
ministers.‖27 As a form of proto-ideology critique, Daoism thus reveals how moral 
systems of belief serve as justifications of the underlying pathological practices rather 
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 Hubert Schleichert and Heiner Roetz (2009, 113-114).  
25
 Zhuang-Zi (1968, book 14, 156). 
26
 The ―postmodern‖ conception of such a liquid self is seen primarily as a problem rather than a 
potential by Bauman (2006) and Sennett (1998). 
27
 Dao-De-Jing (2002, chapter 18). 
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than adequately addressing and, wherever possible, transforming them. The point 
made by Daoists is that it is not helpful to change the moral convictions of the time as 
long as one does not also change the underlying practices.  
  In the earlier analysis of the logic of instrumental action we have seen that by way 
of trying to master the present for the sake of a future project, the openness of the 
present is closed and the present shrinks. Constant innovation becomes a means in 
order to desperately try to gather more experiences and rush after fugitive goals in 
every shorter time spans. Critical theory has been incapable of addressing the 
pathology of acceleration in theoretically plausible and practically promising ways by 
failing to see through the temporal structure underlying instrumental, purposive 
action. This becomes particularly obvious when we turn to the third dimension of a 
critical social theory, that of opening up or at least pointing to transformative 
dimensions. In order to distance itself from the norms prevalent in the society, critical 
theory in a Daoist spirit has to point to something that is not only significantly 
different, but also significantly better. Only when it is possible to disclose 
possibilities that promise to overcome or at least significantly ameliorate the 
diagnosed pathologies as forms of social injury are we dealing with a progressive 
rather than reactionary force. The emancipatory dimension distinguishes mere 
cultural critique from critical theory.  
  In what way, then, does a reconstruction of Daoist conception of the relationship 
between optimal action and time point towards a transformative potential in the 
present? A charitable reconstruction of the concept of wu-wei would, without doubt, 
have to abandon certain metaphysical background assumptions common to ancient 
Daoism. In particular it is necessary to dismiss the cosmological conception of a basic 
harmony of the cosmos as well as the possibility of retreating from societies, 
including the norms governing these societies. It is not plausible to assume that the 
moderns have simply lost the right path or dao, because this would presuppose that 
there once was or always is a right path one could be led astray from. Rather, we 
might say metaphorically that the dao itself has become astray to express that social 
structures take on pathological forms. In other words, many of the pathologies of late 
modern societies are not directly to be attributed to the decisions of individual actors 
but are structural dimensions governing all spheres of society as much as theses 
spheres are only reproduced through human action. Actors cannot simply leave 
behind an unhealthy for a healthy dao, but have to uncover dimensions within dao, 
dimensions pointing to forms of actions, which allow for flourishing and 
transformation from within. Given these ramifications, a charitable interpretation of 
wu-wei could provide valuable insights for contemporary action theory in the context 
of critical social theory. I have suggested that wu-wei, understood as pertaining to the 
form of an action performed in an effortless way, provides a radically different 
conception of optimal action from that of purposive, instrumental activity.  
  As a key normative concept, wu-wei could perhaps be better translated as, 
following Ames and Hall, ―non-coercive action‖ or, following Eric Sean Nelson, as 
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―effortless non-calculative responsiveness‖28 to avoid the passive and quietist 
implications associated with the literal translation ―non-action‖ or ―non-doing‖.29 
Since the term appears in many different contexts and different texts, it can at best 
serve as an umbrella concept covering a potentially unlimited set of practices, which 
have some things in common and diverge in other dimensions. It is fair to say that 
due to its high valuation in classical Chinese texts, activities or forms of 
responsiveness referred to as displaying the structure of wu-wei present an 
achievement. They are optimal forms of comportment. While they can be cultivated, 
they don't follow the same means-end rationality which reduces the means to be only 
instrumentally useful and has a tendency to wear subjects out in accelerating 
processes of a forgetfulness of the present.  
  It has been argued by Chris Fraser, among others, that it is misleading to conceive 
of wu-wei as a form of effortless action and that it would be better to interpret it as 
non-intentional action instead.
30
 To understand why it is nevertheless justified to 
understand wu-wei as involving effortless dimensions rather than focusing on non-
intentionality it is essential to distinguish two different senses of effort. This will 
allow us to avoid the misunderstanding that wu-wei would be an irrational, non-
purposive state of simply letting oneself go without conscious focus. Wu-wei 
interrupts a certain form of effortful striving. When referring to effort, we often 
conflate objective effort with subjectively experienced effort. While the former 
includes the exercise of physiological processes (physical effort) as well as thought 
processes (mental effort), the latter refers to the subjective feeling of exertion and 
exhaustion.
31
 When translating wu-wei as a form of ―effortless non-calculative 
responsiveness‖ (rather than nonintentional action), what is meant is not the absence 
of objective effort, but a decreasing amount of subjectively experienced 
strenuousness. Such forms of performing an action without exhausting oneself 
coincide with the deliberate and often skilled performance of a practice. Often 
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 Ames and Hall (2003, 44-45); Eric Sean Nelson (2009, 294-316 and 396).  
29
 For the purpose of this paper I will ignore the use of wu-wei as literally doing nothing and relegating 
tasks to subordinates in the context of good governance depicted in the figure of the emperor who, by 
relegating all authorities and responsibilities to his inferiors, constitutes the invisible and inactive 
center of power. See Roger Ames (1994).   
30
 Chris Fraser proposes to adopt a diachronic model of action in which ―acquisition begins with 
deliberate exertion, but eventually we internalize the skill and develop the ability to act automatically 
and sometimes effortlessly‖ (2007, 101). Such a quasi-Aristotelian two-phase model of action (first 
effortful acquisition and habituation, then effortless exertion of a skill) might fit some of the examples 
in Zhuang-Zi, including that of butcher Ding. It is not in line with wu-wei as the instantaneous 
transformation of the nature of one's character and action as it is introduced in the respective passages 
from Dao-De-Jing. In our context, the two-phase model would be incapable of explaining the 
transition from a perfectionist, future-oriented form of cultivation to an effortless and skillful 
engagement with the present. Effortless action is not the goal of causally necessary forms of antecedent 
acts of cultivation, but it constitutes a transfiguration of the very form of the action an actor is involved 
in. It could happen any moment and could also be lost again when replacing spontaneity with a blind 
following of rules. 
31
 The distinction is introduced by Brian Bruya in the introduction to the rich collection of 
interdisciplinary essays on effortless attention (2010, 5).  
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effortless actions tend to coincide precisely with an increased form of identification 
with highly complex forms of skilled action ranging from playing chess and juggling 
to speaking a natural language fluently. These actions are intentional in the sense that 
when being asked why an actor engages in them, he could provide a reason for his 
action as an answer.
32
 However, when wu-wei-like actions are conducted well, the 
consciousness of these reasons and especially the conscious fixation on future goals, 
which needs to be actualized through significant degrees of subjectively felt 
exhaustion, drops out of the field of experience of the actor.  
  One classic example to illustrate the structure of wu-wei-like actions is the story 
of cook Ding mentioned in Zhuang-Zi. The cook perfected the skill of cutting up oxen 
by learning how to use a knife with the greatest subtlety, avoiding any unnecessary 
friction. Ding did so by "using his cultivated intuition rather than his eyes" to cut up 
the ox according to his joints, avoiding all unnecessary resistance and thereby 
transforming an instrumental skill into an effective and context-sensitive art, an ars 
contextualis.
33
 He perfected the art of butchery to the point of not having to blindly 
follow rules in a subjectively as well as objectively (with regard to the sharpness of 
the blade of the knife) exhausting way. This does not mean that cutting up the ox does 
not confront the butcher with challenges. Otherwise he would not even need a knife 
and would not be a master of his art. It also does not mean that Ding could not 
provide reasons for what he is doing. After all, he explains his philosophy of intuitive 
mastery to Lord Wen-Hui. However, when challenges arise, Ding stops for a moment 
to ―size up the difficulties‖ and focuses on the activity in the present in a slow and 
calm manner rather than wasting his energies in forms of overly strenuous and hasty 
acts of applying a context-independent method. The story does not simply illustrate 
the benefits of wu-wei-like action, but offers a normative model, which "goes beyond 
skill" and, in Lord Wen-Hui‘s words, illustrates ―the secret of caring for life‖.34 This 
secret, we may infer, is that the mastery of practices does not rest on analyzing or 
reasoning from principles, but in spontaneously attending to a situation intuitively and 
with a high degree of effortless concentration and dedication.   
  What is significant for our context is the specific temporality of engaging in wu-
wei. What the concept wu-wei designates is a perfection in the moment of present 
action rather than a perfection the goal of which is being projected into the future. 
The vital organ of decision making processes is the heart-mind xin (心) rather than 
the disembodied intellect. ―For the ancient Chinese,‖ A.C. Graham remarks, ―the 
heart, not the brain, is the organ of thought. Most men use it to plan ahead, but the 
sage uses it only to reflect the situation as it objectively is, before he responds. Like a 
mirror, it reflects only the present; it is not stuffed with past information which it 
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 The thesis that an action is distinct from a mere physiological occurrence in terms of the answer that 
would be given by an actor or observers about the intention embodied in the action is developed in 
G.E.M. Anscombe (1957). 
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 Roger T. Ames (1989). 
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 Zhuang-Zi (chapter 3).  
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‗retains‘ (ts'ang [cang 藏] ‗stores, hoards‘) at the cost of being trapped in obsolete 
attitudes. The sage perceives and responds to every situation as new.‖35 
  Seen from a temporal perspective, wu-wei is intended to free the future-creating 
presence as it discloses itself from the perspective of an actor who is pursuing his task 
in a skillful and whole-hearted fashion in the ever new and newly experienced 
present. The actor is fully absorbed into performing an action well to the point of 
forgetting himself, the passage of time, as well as extrinsic goals of the action. It is 
easy to see that an action carried out in this way is also self-rewarding while being 
indirectly efficacious. The actor forgets the passage of time and is not being inhibited 
by the anxiety connected to goal fixation while he might nevertheless indirectly 
realize goals which are important to him. Being in a state of fully absorbed, 
meaningful and skilled action includes a heightened responsiveness to the constantly 
changing potential of the context surrounding the action. Rather than acting only 
locally by detaching a certain task, instrument or goal from its context, the actor 
mirrors the situation in its entirety. By freeing the attention for the demands of the 
present moment from the weight of a recollected past and the demands of a not yet 
present future, it allows an action to be spontaneous rather than being guided by a 
fixed plan the goal of which is projected beyond the here and now. The actor is not 
wearing himself out in the process of being plagued by a deadline attached to his 
project, but exercises his energies efficiently in the mastery of the art of perfecting 
action.   
  Based on the concept of wu-wei, a critique of the temporal logic underlying 
instrumental action that is lacking in critical theory becomes possible. In contrast to 
the inactivity of an apathetic person, the actor practicing wu-wei engages the present 
in non-instrumental ways. Rather than limiting non-instrumental action to the 
aesthetic realm as has been common in the European tradition from Schiller until 
Adorno or that of intersubjectivity as in the tradition from Kant to Habermas and 
Honneth, the domains in which actions can be practiced in a wu-wei-like manner is 
virtually unlimited.  
  Drawing on insights arising from analytic philosophy of mind and action, Chris 
Fraser has shown that wu-wei can be understood as what John Searle refers to as ―the 
Background‖.36 The Background is a term of art referring to the various tacit 
capacities, abilities and know-how an actor always already draws on whenever 
performing an action. These unthematized background conditions allow for an action 
to be successful while facing real time challenges that could not be solved through 
slow acts of premeditation. Classic examples would be the intuitive operation of a 
car's transmission or speaking a language fluently. These actions are being performed 
without having to calculate which gear is appropriate for which speed or consciously 
having to apply the rules of grammar.  
  Fraser ultimately criticizes wu-wei-based normative accounts of action since they 
proclaim to do away with the kind of higher-level deliberation that he rightly 
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considers fundamental to engaging in moral reasoning and other practices. I agree 
with Fraser that it is necessary to account for these forms of intentional deliberation 
while I disagree with him in excluding higher order intentional deliberation from the 
realm of potentially wu-wei forms of activities. What Fraser's reductivist analysis of 
wu-wei understood as nonintentional action fails to see is that reasoning is an action 
as well, a thought-action.
37
 Thought actions also always presuppose a background of 
tacit assumptions, including normative assumptions, meanings and associations of 
concepts, etc. A contemporary reconstruction of the concept of wu-wei understood as 
effortless non-calculative responsiveness (rather than nonintentional action) can thus 
also be applied to cognitive thought-acts. In the mentioned story of butcher Ding as 
well as other stories, Zhuang Zi emphasizes that the person who knows what he is 
doing often engages in thinking before he makes his moves. However, such thinking 
does not decide between alternative courses of action by applying rules in judgment 
(bian 辩). Rather, as A.C. Graham points out, such a form of attentive thinking is  an 
intuitive sorting out (lun 論).38 Accordingly, artificial forms of deliberation, which are 
nonspontaneous, strenuous and fixated on following predetermined principles and 
future goals, are then to be distinguished from those kinds of genuine thought-actions 
which are conducted in a skillful, responsive and spontaneous manner with a 
heightened attention for and awareness of the specific needs of the evolving present. 
Daoism would espouse the latter while dismissing the former practices. Free 
intentional deliberation consists in an open encounter with intentional contents. 
Searle's assertion that ―intentionality reaches down to the bottom level of the 
voluntary actions‖39 thus needs to be extended by adding that spontaneity and 
effortlessness receptivity also reaches all the way up to the level of intentionality.
40
 
Only by acknowledging that wu-wei potentially applies to all actions, including 
thought-acts, do we get an insight into the scope and impact of Daoist naturalism. 
Once we acknowledge that many of our thought contents, as Galan Strawson's puts it, 
―just happen‖,41 the question becomes whether we can make any general claims about 
how to relate to them responsively. Actors are not simply confronted with neutral, 
occurring episodes entering and leaving their field of attention, but stand to their 
streams of consciousness in a relationship that Harry Frankfurt aptly characterizes as 
one of caring.
42
 In the process of wu-wei-like action, the actor does not distinguish 
between an instrumental value of intermediary goals and an absolute value of the 
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 See Angus C. Graham (1983, 7-8); for the meaning of ‗lun‘ see also A.C. Graham (2004, 28).   
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 Cited by Fraser (2008, 90).  
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 The importance of spontaneity for intentional action and judgment has been worked out by John 
McDowell (1994).   
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 Galen Strawson (2003, 228). Strawson stresses that thought processes are not correctly characterized 
as primarily consisting of conscious actions as much as they are activities, thus echoing the literal 
translation of wu-wei as a form of non-doing or an "action which is not an action".  
42
 Harry Frankfurt writes ―In my view, it is only in virtue of what we actually care about that anything 
is important to us. The world is everywhere infused for us with importance; many things are important 
to us.‖ (2006, 20); see also Frankfurt (1988).  
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future, final goal. Rather, as Graham shows, the only imperative of the Daoist critic of 
imperatives is ―respond with awareness of what is objectively so.‖43 If an action is 
performed in a wu-wei-like manner, the actor does not only, and not even primarily 
care for the realization of the goals of his action, but also cares about how well, in the 
sense of how attentive, the action leading to such a realization is being performed. 
Daoists agree that if an action is carried out well, the actor responds to streams of 
inherently interconnected mental and physical events in a focused and context-
sensitive manner. He is in a state of acquiescence to the specificity of the task 
performed and the context in which it is performed. In other words, he stops to see 
these events as unacceptable intruders that need to be sorted out anxiously according 
to given rules and reified plans, but as providing occasions or invitations for actions, 
actions which are responsive, sensitive and focused.  
  The implications of conceiving of optimal intentional action as not being one of 
an overtaxing, future-directed effort, but one that effortlessly focuses on the demands 
of the present, are far reaching. An action, which is not based on the logic of striving 
for future goals but on performing a practice well in the here and now, is the most 
efficacious form of practice since it does not waste its energy in fruitless 
confrontation. This is not to say that wu-wei-like actions could not be executed 
quickly. Wu-wei concerns the form rather than the speed in which an action is carried 
out. Whether an action is being performed quickly or slowly does not determine 
whether it is performed in an absorbed and responsive way. Sitting still, for example 
in the context of meditation, can be non-wu-wei-like in involving a lot of effort when 
the person meditating forces himself to sit still for ulterior goals. The skilled mastery 
of the juggler over his cascades or the engagement in a lively conversation, on the 
other hand, might be performed quasi-automatically even if involving quick and 
spontaneous responses. Conscious deceleration, be it through eating in a slower pace 
or turning to meditation, might further perpetuate the temporal logic of the 
instrumental calculus as long as it is performed with too much effort and connected to 
a focus on an extrinsic concern. The efficacy of effortless action is not one measured 
by calculating future gains against present costs, but one that takes into account how 
far the acting individual is in fact in tune with the rhythm of his or her environment 
by responding to challenges of that environment as they arise in ever readjusting 
forms. Such a process of being ―in tune‖ combines mastery and responsiveness, 
engagement and receptivity, order and spontaneity, purpose and disinterestedness. 
Effortless action is thus not subject to following a universal set of norms as the 
Confucians (or Kantians) would have it. Rather, a person performing actions well 
generates singular norms that arise from, and do justice to, the concrete situation 
(auto-nomous).  
  The state of mind that a person is in while exercising noncalculative and 
responsive action has been compared to what psychologists have described as ―flow 
experience‖. Flowing action provides an antidote to the accelerating, reifying and 
disenchanting logic that drives instrumental action. It comes as no surprise that 
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Zhuang Zi‘s story concerning cook Ding's perfected carving of an ox serves as a 
prominent example in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's classic Flow: The Psychology of 
Optimal Experience in which ‗yu‘ (御) is being translated as ‗flow‘.44 Flow comes 
about when human actors are absorbed in the present tasks at hand. The present tasks 
at hand are seen as providing living potentials rather than dead means for ulterior 
ends. When actors in flow states are confronted by a challenging task, the completion 
of this task lets the actor forget the past and the future. Interrupting ordinary 
strenuous comportment, an actor undergoing flow experiences also overcomes a 
reified sense of self, thereby ―dereifying‖ or liquifying, reenchanting, and 
decelerating his relationship to the objects he produces, himself, the act of production 
and his fellow human beings. Flow arises out of a balancing act that is in constant 
danger of collapsing either into becoming a rote routine or an overtaxing effort. The 
overtaxing effort brings forth unnecessary forms of reactions, while the rote routine 
lacks the sense of freedom and potential. The art of wu-wei thus consists in 
successfully striking and sustaining a balance between extreme effort and passive 
rule-following. If an actor is capable of sustaining such a balance, there is a harmony 
between his desires and will. In this sense wu-wei-kind of actions are free actions as 
they are characterized by Frankfurt: ―a free act is one that a person performs simply 
because he wants to perform it. Enjoying freedom of action consists in maintaining 
this harmonious accord between what we do and what we want to do.‖45 As different 
as the underlying temporality is, the guiding ideal of effortless, attentive actions 
provides a surprising overlap with the guiding Western ideal of positive freedom.  
  Let me end by returning to the legend concerning the origin of the Dao-De-Jing. 
According to this legend, the book was written down by Lao Zi through his student as 
a form of road toll in order to pass the toll-keeper at the Han pass when moving West. 
It is an irony of history that perhaps the first critique of the principle of exchanging 
the present for the future was passed down to us based on an operation of exchanging 
the written word for the right of passage. Lao Zi, the first critic of the assumption that 
we could once and for all fix the living knowledge necessary to traverse the changing 
way with timeless principles,
46
 paid for his final passage by writing down and thus 
codifying the idea according to which water defeats the stone. Walter Benjamin, 
perhaps the most Daoist member of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, wrote a 
brief commentary on Brecht's poetic image of this scene. The commentary stresses 
that Lao Zi's friendliness and cheerfulness interrupted the principle of equivalent 
exchange by ―rendering a great service as if it were trivial.‖ We might also say, as if 
it were non-calculative, effortless and responsive. Lao Zi, Benjamin continues, thus 
―places these world-historical days under the motto: ‗All right-just a brief stop‘.‖ It is 
the act of an effortless giving and thereby interrupting the journey without leading to 
a standstill that is forcefully conjured up in this anecdote. Capturing the spirit and the 
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 Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (2008, 255). See also Chris Jochim (1998). 
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 Harry Frankfurt (2006, 14).  
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 ―A Way that can be followed is not a constant Way. A name that can be named is not a constant 
name.‖ Dao-De-Jing, trans. Ivanhoe (chapter 1).  
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specific presenting temporality of effortlessness, Benjamin asks ―and what use would 
his wisdom be if he who forgot the valley (which he had just looked on with pleasure 
again) when he rounded the next corner did not also forget his anxieties about the 
future almost as soon as he felt them?‖47 Critical theory has yet to come to terms with 
the radical potential of such seemingly small, spontaneous, effortless, friendly, 
forgetful and anxiety-free acts in the midst of precarious times.  
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